Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2016

The Corporation as Courthouse
Rory Van Loo
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse , in 33 Yale Journal on Regulation 547 (2016).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/30

This Article is brought to you for free and open access
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. For more information, please contact
lawlessa@bu.edu.

Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016).

The Corporation as Courthouse
Yale Journal on Regulation
Rory Van Loo

†

Despite the considerable attention paid to mandatory arbitration, few
consumer disputes ever reach arbitration. By contrast, institutions such as
Apple’s customer service department handle hundreds of millions of disputes
annually. This Article argues that understanding businesses’ internal dispute
processes is crucial to diagnosing consumers’ procedural needs. Moreover,
businesses’ internal processes interact with a larger system of private actors.
These actors include ratings websites that mete out reputational sanctions. The
system also includes other corporations linked to the transaction, such as when
American Express adjudicates a contested sale between a shopper and Home
Depot. This vast private order offers promise to advance societal dispute
resolution goals by providing large-scale redress and preserving relationships
in ways that more formal institutions cannot. At the same time, businesses
closely guard their internal processes as trade secrets. Out of public view, they
are pushing the bounds of dispute resolution by, for example, considering
factors such as a customer’s social network in deciding how to handle a
complaint. If public intervention is needed, courts are at best only part of the
solution. Instead, the frontier of consumer dispute resolution lies beyond
arbitration and class actions in agency supervision of collaborative
negotiations between consumers and corporations.
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Introduction
A vigorous debate is underway about privatization through mandatory
1
arbitration. One group thinks that it is an efficient mode of dispute resolution.
Another group believes that access to courts—particularly to aggregate
litigation—is essential, and that corporations use mandatory arbitration to
2
“erase” consumer rights. Although these discussions provide valuable insights,
arbitrators rarely handle consumer disputes. By way of illustration, the
American Arbitration Association—the leading non-profit provider of
3
arbitration—adjudicates fewer than 1,500 consumer cases annually. In
1. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“The
point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient,
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”).
2.
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2811, 2893 (2015).
3. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 91 (2015) (finding 1,075 consumer cases
annually are decided by the AAA). Companies also rarely use contract terms to customize public dispute
resolution processes. See David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389,
394 (2014) (“[E]ven in circumstances where we would expect them to, parties almost never use contract
terms to vary their post-dispute procedural contests.”).
2
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contrast, the online marketplace eBay alone internally handles 60 million
4
disputes each year between buyers and sellers. Comcast’s customer service
5
department has over a million customer touch points each day. The main
institutional actor in the private consumer legal system is not the arbitration
6
tribunal, but the consumer-facing corporation.
Although legal scholars have written thousands of pages about arbitration
in recent years, they have largely ignored businesses’ internal processes for
7
resolving consumer disputes. Yet these unexamined processes are pushing the
bounds of dispute resolution beyond anything seen in courts or arbitration. The
result sometimes conflicts with traditional notions of justice. For example,
Bank of America recently developed big data software that considers the
wealth of family members in deciding how to handle a customer’s request for a
8
fee waiver. At the same time, new internal business processes are advancing
societal goals in numerous ways, such as by making it ever more possible to
obtain low-cost redress that preserves the relationship between the parties.
Rolled out over hundreds of millions of disputes each year, the design of
companies’ internal processes can influence efficiency, the distribution of
wealth, and fairness on a massive scale.
This Article’s main aim is to contribute an institutional account of how
companies resolve the most common type of consumer dispute—small-value
9
transactional disputes of a few hundred dollars or less. Scholars have produced

4. See Louis F. Del Duca et al., Ebay’s De Facto Low Value High Volume Resolution
Process: Lessons and Best Practices for ODR Systems Designers, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 204,
205 (2014) (reporting sixty million disputes handled by eBay annually).
5. David Segal, When a Company Doesn’t Sound Like a Broken Record, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2014, at B5.
6. Scholars have made a related broader point, arguing without quantifying the issue
that there is a need to pay greater attention to organizations’ internal processes for handling a variety of
disputes, such as those between employee and employer, citizen and government, and consumer and
business. See, e.g., Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 999-1000
(1979) (noting that scholars seldom focus on complaints by citizens to corporations and government
bureaucracies).
7. Existing proposals for public intervention—which mostly focus on providing
greater access to public courts, or regulating arbitration—do not speak to the question of how to shape
corporations’ internal processes. These proposals often assume that “businesses can escape all
accountability for causing small harms if they can escape class actions.” See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The
End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 166 (2015). See also Resnik, supra note 2, at 2921
(exploring ways to allow public court review of arbitration); Nader, supra note 6, at 1000 (concluding
“access to the legal system is crucial if extralegal processes are ever to provide effective relief for
consumer and citizen complaints.”).
8.
See
U.S.
Patent
No.
7797212
(filed
Oct
31,
2006),
http://www.google.com/patents/US7797212 (describing Bank of America’s automated refund tool).
9. The average consumer transaction is for less than $100. See FED. RESERVE, 2013
FEDERAL
RESERVE
PAYMENTS
STUDY
(Dec.
19,
2013),
https://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/2013_payments_study_summary.pdf,
at
Exhibit 2 (estimating the average transaction value in 2012 at $94 for credit cards and $39 for debit
cards); Barbara Bennett et al., Cash Continues To Play a Key Role in Consumer Spending: Evidence
from the Diary of Consumer Payment Choice, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. (April 2014),
http://www.frbsf.org/cash/publications/fed-notes/2014/april/cash-consumer-spending-payment-diary
(reporting the average amount of a cash consumer transaction as $21). Disputes are more likely to be
3
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in-depth institutional analyses of related internal corporate dispute resolution,
10
11
such as in employment proceedings and tort settlement. The literature lacks
anything similar for small-value transactional disputes. For these, unlike in
contexts typically studied, the corporation is the closest thing to a courthouse
that most consumers will encounter—although just how close depends on the
12
context.
Scholars have produced analyses valuable to this project. For example,
they have discussed how the ultimate outcome of the consumer-business
13
dispute often deviates from the contract. This particular feature fits into a
broader contract law theory of the customer service department as a site of
displaced bargaining about the less salient terms of adhesive contracts—a kind
of modern “analog to the village market . . . adapted to the needs of a mass14
contracting age.” Instead of inefficiently requiring the vast majority of parties
initiated for higher transaction values, but even so the typical amount in dispute is low. For example,
eBay’s 60 million annual disputes are for an average of $70 to $100 in value. See Del Duca et al., supra
note 4, at 205. This is only slightly higher than the estimated average transaction at eBay of about $55 in
2013. See Sumit Roy, Average Selling Price of Merchandise on eBay, ONLINE MARKETING TRENDS
(March 2011), http://www.onlinemarketing-trends.com/2011/03/average-selling-price-of-merchandise
-on.html. Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman have in an analogous context asserted that consumer cases
include those in banking and insurance, but exclude “employment, antitrust, and securities actions, and
virtually all mass tort class actions.” See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class
Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104
n.5 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold
Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941, 944 (1999)
(focusing on employment law in discussing how organizations internalize legal disputes).
11. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 805, 805 (2011); Dana A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101
VA. L. REV. 129, 130 (2015).
12. The metaphor of the corporation as courthouse fits better with some of its dispute
resolution roles than others. For example, the processes in which one business is adjudicating a dispute
between another business and a consumer more closely approximates a public trial than does the
customer service department handling a complaint. However, even in the customer service department,
business designers aim to create the perception of procedural justice and a neutral decision maker. Thus,
analyses traditionally reserved for institutions such as public courts may be more relevant than
commonly assumed. See infra Part I.
13. See Lisa Bernstein & Hagay Volvovsky, Comment on the Work of Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler: Not What You Wanted To Know: The Real Deal and the Paper Deal in Consumer
Contracts, 11 JERUSALEM REV. L. STUD. 1-4 (forthcoming, 2016) (arguing for greater attention to the
substantive deal consumers actually get rather than focusing solely on the terms of the contract, which
companies often ignore in the “real deal”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are ‘Pay Now, Terms Later’
Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 309
(2009) (finding that software publishers who reveal dispute resolution terms later offer no more onesided terms than those who reveal the terms in advance); Nader, supra note 6, at 1012-14 (describing the
consumer complaint process as manipulating consumers but generally giving persistent consumers what
they request); Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 279 (2012) (concluding that corporations who violate the law use their customer service
departments to appease consumers who complain for the strategic purpose of being able to continue
violating other consumers’ rights); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory
of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers,
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 865 (2006) (concluding corporations’ cooperation with consumers who
complain can be viewed as efficient).
14. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, CONTRACT LAW AND LEGAL METHODS 1316-19 (2012)
(describing customer service department interactions with consumers over contractual matters as
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who will never have a dispute to negotiate about each term before the initial
transaction is completed, these processes theoretically allow consumers and
corporations to negotiate about those terms only as necessary when a dispute
15
arises.
This Article builds on that literature to describe a more comprehensive
16
dispute system for consumers. In this largely private order, the corporation
plays three key dispute resolution roles. The first is the customer service
department handling disputes about its own products. The literature has not
only failed to grasp the scale of this institution, but has yet to identify important
design features. For example, corporations are increasingly finding ways to
associate their customer service departments with components of procedural
justice that legal scholars have long identified as important for legitimacy
elsewhere, such as for law enforcement. These include ensuring people feel like
they have a voice, are treated with respect, and have their disputes handled by a
17
trustworthy decision maker.
The second main dispute resolution role is largely absent from the
literature: when the corporation serves as a judge for disputes between its own
consumers and independent, third-party sellers. These network trials have
exploded in recent years due to both financial and online intermediation. In the
financial context, between fifty million and one hundred million times each
year credit card companies such as American Express adjudicate disputes
between a consumer and the merchant who sold the product, such as Home
18
Depot or Walmart. Also, Internet companies such as eBay, Amazon, and
Uber increasingly adjudicate disputes between buyers and sellers or between
19
drivers and passengers. Because this form of adjudication involves an

“displaced bargaining”). In a related strand of scholarship about business deals, Stewart Macaulay and
others have argued that the contract often does not reflect the actual terms of an agreement. See, e.g.,
Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (1985).
15. See Johnston, supra note 13, at 865. According to this view, courts should
approach customer service department interactions as negotiations about what the contract terms should
be rather than disputes about what the contract terms are. See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1319.
16. A system can be seen as a series of interlocking processes. See NANCY H.
ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES 3 (2013).
17. See infra section I.B.2. These elements have been found to matter more than
substantive outcomes for peoples’ perception of authorities’ legitimacy in other legal contexts, such as
in criminal law. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
18. See, e.g., SUMIT SOOD & JOSEPH PINIPE, WIPRO, CARD DISPUTES AND
CHARGEBACKS 5, https://www.wipro.com/documents/card-disputes-and-chargebacks.pdf (describing a
chargeback band between .05 and .1 percent of all transactions as “a conservative range.”). A
chargeback rate of .05% to .1% would amount to 50 million to 100 million chargebacks requested
annually. See FED. RES. SYSTEM, THE 2013 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY, at Exhibits 4, 8, 10,
(Dec.
19,
2013),
https://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/2013_payments_study_summary.pdf
(estimating 122.8 billion noncash payments in 2012, excluding wire transfers and checks, the vast
majority of which are consumer transactions). A large portion of these are fraud-related (unauthorized
use of credit card). See id.
19. See supra note 4; Colin Rule, Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Effective
Redress: Large E-Commerce Data Sets and the Cost-Benefit Case for Investing in Dispute Resolution,
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intermediary with an interest in preserving the relationship with both sides, it
raises a distinct set of questions from those raised by arbitration and the
20
traditional customer service department.
The corporation plays a third key dispute resolution role as a reputationbased enforcement mechanism. Legal scholars have in a number of contexts,
such as among diamond merchants or Shasta County cattle ranchers,
documented how reputation sanctions enable the establishment of private
21
orders. In those contexts, any party who violates a norm suffers such harmful
reputational damage from gossip networks or other social ties that
transgressions rarely occur, and more formal enforcement mechanisms are
22
seldom used. The literature lacks any such systems analysis for consumer
disputes, which are assumed to work differently due to a larger sophistication
imbalance between consumers and corporations, and due to more distant
23
relationships, which make reputation-based sanctions less powerful.
However, in the consumer context information websites are filling the
enforcement role that gossip networks and social ties play in commerce
between businesses. When dissatisfied, consumers today can reach large
audiences through outlets such as Twitter, Facebook, Yelp, and Ripoff
24
Report.
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 767, 767 (2012) (describing eBay and PayPal’s online dispute
system).
20. See infra section I.C.
21. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1762 (2001) (“[T]o fully
understand the reasons that the industry has found it advantageous to opt out of the legal system, it is
useful to consider how the system as a whole is structured to create the conditions under which
cooperative contracting relationships are most likely to arise and endure.”) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Cotton Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 126 (1992) (examining the “dispute resolution system in
the diamond industry. . .”) [hereinafter Bernstein, Diamond Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational
Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
(Winter 2015) (concluding that large industrial buyers have “structured their relationships with their
suppliers in ways that are designed . . . to make the legal system largely irrelevant to their interactions.”)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Procurement Contracts]; Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute
Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 677 (1986) (finding that when
wandering cattle damage land, ranchers and farmers neglect the remedies provided by trespass law and
instead resolve disputes in accordance with neighborliness.). But see Barak Richman, An Autopsy of
Cooperation:
Diamond
Dealers
and
the
Limits
of
Trust-Based
Exchange,
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2764470 (unpublished manuscript) (documenting a
breakdown of trust in the diamond industry).
22. See, e.g., Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 21, at 1724-25, 1751-52
(discussing the importance of information intermediaries, trade associations, gossip networks, and social
ties in the cotton industry).
23. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 13, at 283 (contrasting the balanced sophistication
in business-to-business contexts with consumers’ lack of understanding in consumer contexts). Some
scholars have recognized the potential for reputation websites to improve markets and protect
consumers. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1709 (2008) (“Imagine if every plumber, every manufactured
product . . . and every taxi driver was rated . . . .”). However, scholars have understudied the link to the
private consumer legal system.
24. See infra section I.C.
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Thus, to understand privatized dispute resolution, it is important to go
beyond individual mechanisms such as arbitration. The corporation’s various
roles—including as site of contractual renegotiation, network judge, and
reputation enforcer—provide the backbone for a private consumer dispute
system. Because the literature lacks a comprehensive account of this system’s
features, it necessarily lacks a comprehensive assessment of its promises and
pitfalls. The more promising aspects are low-cost access to redress, direct
accountability, and collaborative dispute resolution. Its pitfalls include a lack of
transparency, the potential to exacerbate inequality, and susceptibility to market
failures.
These promises and pitfalls raise the question of what reforms, if any, are
needed. Existing proposals to reform consumer dispute resolution focus on
arbitration or courts. This Article’s analysis indicates an important possibility is
missing from those conversations: administrative agency regulation of
businesses’ dispute functions. Unlike most proposals, this approach emphasizes
consumer-facing companies as the core institutional actors, and then asks how
best to improve them. Companies must continue to play a central dispute
resolution role because it would simply be impractical for courts or arbitrators
to handle hundreds of millions of small value contractual consumer disputes
annually—and particularly at the low costs at which dispute resolution becomes
25
feasible for small-value claims.
The inevitability of mass internal corporate dispute resolution
distinguishes this Article’s focus from much of the rich literature arguing either
26
for alternative dispute resolution or “against settlement.” Those conversations
largely address contexts in which cases would otherwise be handled in courts,
27
which raises distinct issues such as the erosion of the substantive law. For
small-value contractual disputes, consumers and corporations rarely bargain in
28
the shadow of the law in the first place. Instead, they largely bargain in the
29
shadow of norms.

25. See infra section III.A. The best hope for courts or arbitration-like entities
handling small-value contractual disputes would be through some form of online dispute resolution. See,
e.g., Schmitz, supra note 19, at 325 (calling on policy makers to create an online dispute resolution
processes for consumer claims). By introducing an additional intermediary, online dispute resolution
would still risk undermining some important features of the existing system, such as the greater
efficiency possible by not introducing an additional third party.
26. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing
against those who seek to promote settlement over adjudication).
27. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3052 (2015) (arguing that the rise of arbitration has deprived the legal system of
cases crucial for developing the law).
28. Although the law has a small impact on most small value contractual disputes, the
analysis varies by industry. Both the law and intermediary dispute resolution institutions may play a
more important role in shaping consumer-business disputes in some industries, such as insurance. See
Shauhin Talesh, Rule-Intermediaries in Action: How State and Business Stakeholders Influence the
Meaning of Consumer Rights in Regulatory Governance Arrangements, 37 L. & POL’Y 1 (2015). The
shadow of the law metaphor comes from Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
7
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Another key component of this policy implication is that the consumer
agency plays the central public role. Instead of using the blunt instrument of
public courts, agencies can leverage economic expertise and industry-specific
knowledge to tailor intervention. They can also do so more efficiently.
Agencies are thus best situated to address the current system’s pitfalls while
preserving its benefits.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I draws on new and existing
empirical data to explain the major design features of business-consumer
30
dispute processes. These features include cooperative settlement, procedural
justice, tailored outcomes, and procedural experimentalism. Part II examines
the promises and pitfalls of the corporation as courthouse, many of which vary
by market. Part III then assesses the current public backdrop for the private
consumer legal system. Consumer agencies play the most important public role,
and they have significant benefits compared to courts. Yet heavy reliance on
regulation also brings risks. Part IV discusses policy implications. Because
corporations’ dispute processes are so important to consumer justice, yet so
little is known about how decisions are made, regulators should stay informed
about those processes. Also, given that regulatory inadequacies and market
failures are perhaps unavoidable in some industries, society might benefit from
tailored class actions that become available only when other mechanisms fail—
31
a kind of “sunrise class action.”

I. Overview of the Corporation as Courthouse
Corporations are increasingly assuming roles associated with courthouses.
They design procedures and shape the de facto substantive rules governing the
vast majority of consumer disputes. In many instances they adjudicate these
disputes as third parties. Just as Frank Sander articulated a public multi-door
courthouse with litigation as one of many paths to dispute resolution, the web

Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) (concluding that legal
entitlements substantially affect negotiated outcomes).
29. These norms are enforced by market mechanisms, including reputation-based
sanctions. See infra Part I.D. & II.A.4. This does not mean the law is irrelevant. The law and the
possibility that regulators might enforce it can still influence businesses’ conduct. See infra Part III.A.
30. New information was gained from interviews, patents filed by companies
documenting their dispute processes, and complaints filed by consumers on the Internet. Thirty-seven
interviews were conducted of current and former employees in consumer corporations, federal consumer
agencies, consulting firms, and private sector dispute resolution professionals. The interviewees were
selected using snowball sampling. This method may lead to interviews reflecting unrepresentative
views. Also, as with any interview, these sources are susceptible to limited memory and any number of
biases. Actual initials are used when permission was given, and initials are used to preserve
confidentiality. Additional sources include online consumer reviews, empirical studies of complaint
departments, court documents of cases related to complaint handling, and interviews reported in the
media.
31. See text accompanying note 329.
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32

of consumer corporations also offer many paths. This Part provides an
institutional analysis of these overlooked internal processes that account for
such a large part of everyday consumer justice.
A. The Marketplace for Dispute Resolution
Executives pay close attention to the law when designing products and
33
services, and strive to write adhesive contracts in their favor. However, once a
consumer calls to complain, the corporation assumes that the consumer has no
34
credible legal claim. From that point on, complaint decisions are made based
35
on maximizing profit (or minimizing loss). Thus, the design and execution of
corporations’ internal complaint systems are largely disconnected from legal
rights.
In many markets, this corporate profit analysis is driving a business
paradigm shift toward building dispute processes that satisfy customers.
36
Customer satisfaction has long been linked to financial performance. Many
scholars have also concluded that how a company handles its complaints
37
influences overall customer satisfaction. This indirect support suggesting that
effective complaint handling is profitable has in recent years led to findings that
a firm’s complaint handling directly predicts profitability and stock
38
performance. Although it is difficult to isolate why effective complainthandling might be so profitable, the research suggests that retaining customers
39
and promoting word of mouth are both important.
32. See, e.g., Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for
Process-Enabling Ethical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2005) (discussing Frank Sander’s
proposal of a multi-door courthouse, which includes conciliation, mediation and arbitration among other
options). The metaphor of the corporation as courthouse has a similarly expansive view of what a
courthouse may offer to society.
33. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV 240, 240 (2013) (empirically
finding that the average software contract became more pro-seller between 2003 and 2010).
34. Interview with N.B. (June 12, 2015) (former customer service executive of large
bank describing approach to handling customer complaints).
35. See, e.g., Merlin Stone, Literature Review on Complaints Management, 18 J.
DATABASE MARKETING. & CUSTOMER STRATEGY MGMT. 108, 117 (2011).
36. See Xueming Luo and Christian Homburg, Satisfaction, Complaint, and the Stock
Value Gap, 72 J. MARKETING. 29, 29 (2013) (reviewing the literature suggesting customer satisfaction is
linked to companies’ cash flows, the ratio of market value to replacement value of assets, and excess
stock return).
37. See, e.g., Christian Homburg & Andreas Furst, How Organizational Complaint
Handling Drives Customer Loyalty: An Analysis of the Mechanistic and the Organic Approach, 69 J.
MARKETING, 95, 96-97 (2005); Stone, supra note 35, at 113 (concluding it is not the original service
failure that most determines overall dissatisfaction, but how the company handles the dispute once the
failure has arisen).
38. See, e.g., Homburg & Furst, supra note 37, at 95 (citing studies indicating that the
return on investment for complaint management can be above 100%); Luo & Homburg, supra note 36,
at 41 (“A direct implication of our study is that though retaining satisfied customers is critical, handling
complaining customers may help even more in optimizing firms’ stock value.”).
39. See Stone, supra note 35, at 112-13 (discussing data suggesting poor service and
handling of problems explains half of customer switching to competitors and noting customers respond
9
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This literature has led a chorus of academics and consultants to urge
businesses to increase profits by improving their complaint-handling processes.
McKinsey & Co., which advises many of the world’s largest consumer
corporations, has broadly concluded that its clients financially benefit from
prioritizing customers’ problems over what seem to be the immediate sales
40
41
interests of the firm. Businesses are changing their behavior accordingly.
eBay, a rare company that has shared the results of such changed behavior
publicly, found that effective dispute resolution drove repeat customer
42
business.
The strong empirical case for designing internal grievance processes, and
the evidence of large-scale monetary investment in those processes, contradicts
what millions of consumers experience every day: complaining to a corporation
43
is often frustrating. Sixty-eight percent of households experienced customer
44
rage in a recent one-year period. While some dissatisfaction is inevitable, the
consensus among academics and industry experts is that companies often do a
45
poor job of resolving disputes. By some measures, companies do not resolve
46
disputes effectively half of the time.
How are these two perspectives reconciled? Some commentators have
concluded that companies design dispute processes to ensure that consumers
must work hard to obtain redress, such as by purposefully institutionalizing
47
delays, or constructing “good-cop bad-cop” routines. To be sure, in certain

to dissatisfaction with complaint handling by negative word-of-mouth); Mohammad Faryabi et al., The
Relationship Continuity Model and Customer Loyalty in The Banking Industry: A Case Study of the
Maskan Bank of Iran, 14 J. RELATIONSHIP MARKETING 37 (2015) (using a hierarchical regression model
to conclude customer continuity is related to conflict resolution).
40. Marc Beaujean et al., The ‘Moment of Truth’ in Customer Service, MCKINSEY Q.,
Feb. 2006 (finding that after a positive dispute resolution experience 85 percent of consumers spent
more at the company, while after a negative experience 70 percent spent less). See also Luo &
Homburg, supra note 36, at 42 (recommending based on empirical research that companies establish
“[a] companywide financial and strategic environment” that promotes consumer satisfaction in
complaint handling).
41. Christine Crandell, Customer Experience: Is It The Chicken or Egg?, FORBES
(Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christinecrandell/2013/01/21/customer-experience-is-it-the
-chicken-or-egg (“Companies are starting to see the light. They are embracing [customer experience as a
competitive differentiator].”)
42. See Rule, supra note 19, at 767 (“These results . . . offer hard evidence of
economic benefits that can be gleaned from . . . effective redress processes.”).
43. See DEBBIE FREEMAN, New Customer-Rage Study Out for Holiday Shopping
Season, ARIZ. ST. U., (Nov. 26, 2013), https://wpcarey.asu.edu/news-releases/2013-11-26/new
-customer-rage-study-out-holiday-shopping-season (finding widespread customer “rage”).
44. See id.
45. Homburg & Furst, supra note 37, at 95 (reviewing the literature and concluding
that “[t]here is ample evidence that many companies do not handle complaints effectively.”).
46. See Hooman Estelami, Competitive and Procedural Determinants of Delight and
Disappointment in Consumer Complaint Outcomes, 2 J. SERV. RES. 285, 287 (2000).
47. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 13, at 289.

10

Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016).

industries, such as concentrated cable and Internet markets that leave
48
consumers few options, customer satisfaction may matter less.
However, the purposeful creation of frustrating or unfair complaint
processes is likely exaggerated. Quite often dissatisfaction with complaint
handling may simply be due to two underappreciated factors: the propriety of
the company’s actions or corporate incompetence. Consumers sometimes
complain about practices that are not only legal, but conform to most
49
consumers’ sense of fairness. The existence of frustrated consumers does not
always mean that there has been improper complaint handling.
Incompetence in corporations begins with inept profitability analyses of
50
complaint management. A focus on short-term revenues, rather than on the
lifetime value of the customer, causes many firms to underemphasize the
51
solving of customers’ problems. Modern corporations are so large, and
dispute resolution is so complicated, that creating effective processes can
52
require a level of skill and resources akin to launching a new brand. While the
costs associated with dispute resolution—such as for employee salaries,
information technologies, and consumer refunds—are immediate budget line
items, the revenues from customer retention and avoiding negative word-of53
mouth are blended into general revenues over a longer time horizon. The
benefits of dispute resolution are thus less salient than the costs. This
complicates internal advocacy efforts by customer service professionals—who
are only one of many internal-to-the-firm interest groups—to obtain the
necessary leadership buy-in.
Moreover, even when executives are fully aware, designing dispute
54
systems is challenging. And even if the design is flawless, complaint handling
requires subtle front-line and managerial interpersonal skills and support that
55
are not readily found or taught. Like any product launch, despite the

48. A monopolist does, however, have an incentive to maximize value to consumers
in order to get the greatest surplus from which to extract monopoly rent. See infra Part II.B.4.
49. See, e.g., Katherine Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB
Complaint Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 78 (2012) (“Dissatisfied consumers can
be widespread in lawful industries . . . .”).
50. See Torben Hansen et al., Managing Consumer Complaints: Differences and
Similarities Among Heterogeneous Retailers, 38 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 6, 9 (2010).
51. Beaujean et al., supra note 40.
52. See Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 9.
53. See Don Charlett et al., How Damaging Is Negative Word of Mouth?, 6
MARKETING BULL. 42 (1995) (concluding managers underestimate the costs of negative word-of
-mouth).
54. See Stone, supra note 35, at 113-14 (“Even the best service organizations will
find it hard to provide highly effective recoveries for every service failure.”).
55. Beaujean et al., supra note 40 (discussing how one bank found that an important
driver of its underperforming branches was frontline employees’ ineffective problem-solving); Hansen
et al., supra note 50, at 9; Christine James, Confessions of a Fortune 500 Customer Service Rep,
11

Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016).

LINKEDIN PULSE, (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/confessions-fortune-500-customer
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organization’s best efforts, dispute resolution initiatives may fall short of their
targets.
It is thus important to divorce incompetence from intention. If companies
are in the midst of a paradigm shift with respect to complaint resolution,
corporations would be expected to head toward more consumer-friendly
systems as awareness grows and as they undertake the often slow and difficult
56
task of organizational change. A review of the systems being designed inside
corporations, discussed in the following section, suggests this shift is occurring
in many markets.
B. Design Features of Internal Processes
The strong empirical link between complaint resolution and profits has
57
prompted companies to invest increasingly in resolving disputes. Although
58
practices inevitably vary across industries and institutions, it is possible to
identify some general features.
1. Settlement over Adjudication
59

As in business-to-business private legal systems, few consumer disputes
are ever litigated or ever involve lawyers. Corporations instead handle disputes
through settlement. Settlement is preferable to formal adjudication—such as
60
arbitration or litigation—because it leads to higher satisfaction and costs less.
Companies promote settlement both substantively and procedurally.
Substantively, companies facilitate settlement by negotiating the contractual
61
relationship rather than by attempting to enforce their contractual rights. In a

-service-rep-christine-james (quoting a Fortune 500 customer service representative as saying some
representatives “[c]are but they are in the minority . . . . If you want to cancel I will try to save you, but
only because it’s my job.”).
56.
Competition would be expected to “provide a stimulus to improve the quality of
judicial services offered.” See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (proposing in an analogous context “a global market for judicial
services in contract litigation.”).
57.
See, e.g., Crandell, supra note 41 (noting that companies are becoming aware that
improving customers’ experiences pays off).
58.
See Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 6.
59.
See, e.g., Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 21, at 115.
60.
The average up-front costs to consumers are about $100 for claims of less than
$10,000. See Rule, supra note 19, at 776 (concluding buyers were more likely to shop after reaching a
less favorable but amicable settlement than when they won a full refund through eBay’s adjudication);
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 25
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 843 (2010) (finding average costs to consumers of $100 in
arbitration). More broadly, the law also encourages settlement in commercial contexts. The Uniform
Commercial Code, for example, promotes settlements and compromise. See Macaulay, supra note 14, at
469.
61.
Daniel Markovits has argued customer service departments are better theorized as
a negotiation-based rather than adjudication-based model of customer service. See MARKOVITS, supra
note 14, at 1317-1320.
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variety of industries, businesses regularly ignore their strong legal position and
62
make concessions to which the consumer is not legally entitled. Every
Hampton Inn employee can grant one free stay per complaint, while the Ritz63
Carlton permits every employee to spend $2,000 to satisfy a guest. Close to
nine out of ten consumers who asked their credit card company for a fee waiver
after a late payment received it, even though the issuer is contractually entitled
64
to collect.
Procedurally, corporations promote settlement by seeking to enable the
consumer to complain easily through a variety of channels. Consumers have
numerous direct entry points: calling, chatting online, emailing executives, or
visiting a physical branch. In recent years, companies have expanded
consumers’ ease of access to the settlement process by developing social media
departments. Resolution specialists in these departments monitor various
websites such as Twitter and Yelp, and directly reach out to discontented
65
consumers.
Wherever the consumer interfaces—whether in the legal department, the
corporation’s ombud, or elsewhere—the overriding goal is to turn the
complaint into a collaborative discussion. For example, after purchasing an
item from Amazon, if a disgruntled consumer clicks on one star out of five,
instead of that negative rating being submitted immediately, a link appears
saying, “Please click here to contact the seller to resolve any problems with
66
your order before leaving feedback.” Amazon also reminds the consumer of
67
the possibility of simply returning the item. Using similar automated
processes, eBay resolves 90% of submitted disputes without ever involving any

62.
See Johnston, supra note 13, at 865 (“Typically, the firm’s standard-form terms
set out clear and unconditional consumer obligations but allow firm discretion that is exercised by a
supervisory (and sometimes lower level) employee who is given the authority and discretion to
forgive.”); U.S. Patent No. 7,797,212 (filed Oct 31, 2006), http://www.google.com/patents/US7797212
(“[b]anks and other financial institutions must occasionally bend or break the rules for imposing fees
against account holders in the name of customer relations.”).
63.
See
Why
Stay
at
Hampton?,
HAMPTON
INN,
http://hamptoninn3.hilton.com/en/about/index.html; 100% Hampton Inn Satisfaction Guarantee: The
Definitive Thread, FLYERTALK, http://www.flyertalk.com/forum/hilton-hilton-hhonors/465783-100
-hampton-inn-satisfaction-guarantee-definitive-thread-20.html (numerous Hampton Inn guests posting
anecdotes of being immediately offered free stays by the employee at the front desk); Robert Reiss, How
Ritz-Carlton Stays at the Top, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/30/simon
-cooper-ritz-leadership-ceonetwork-hotels.html (explaining Ritz-Carlton’s policy).
64.
See Martin Merzer, Poll: Asking for Better Credit Card Terms Pays Off,
CREDITCARDS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/poll-ask-better-terms.php.
65.
See, e.g., Flavio Martins, Companies Using Social Media Customer Service
Effectively for Customer Retention and Loyalty, WINTHECUSTOMER (July 4, 2014),
http://winthecustomer.com/effective-social-media-customer-service.
66.
See AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com (last visited Feb 9, 2016) (clicking on
“Your Account,” then “Your Orders,” then “Leave seller feedback,” then the icon for one star out of
five).
67.
See id.
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of its employees, by electronically facilitating a discussion between buyer and
68
seller.
Again, this emphasis on settlement is particularly striking because in a
great number of these incidences, consumers would not have any credible
69
threat to sue. Consumers and corporations are, through the complaint process,
often determining what the terms of the contract should be even though
70
arguably a contract is already in place. Thus, whereas privatization in mass
71
torts is dominated by the settlement mill, in mass contracts the corporation is
perhaps closer to a renegotiation mill.
2. Procedural Justice
As companies increasingly understand the relationship between profit and
complaint handling, they are moving their internal processes toward some
measures of procedural justice. Promoting a perception of procedural justice is
profitable because unjust procedures risk angering even otherwise highly
72
satisfied customers. Building off the seminal work of Tom Tyler, scholars
have found that while the substantive outcome matters, the process is equally, if
73
not more, important to consumers in their perceptions of justice. Even when a
company provides relief such as money or store credit, consumers may view
74
the experience unfavorably if they perceive the process as unfair.
More specifically, scholars have identified five main contributors to
consumers’ perception of procedural justice, and thus to their overall
satisfaction and loyalty to the company: voice, respect, speed, trustworthiness,
75
and neutrality.
68.
See Sarah Kessler, Ebay Spinoff Modria Is Judge Judy for Cyber Shoppers,
FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.fastcompany.com/3005402/ebay-spinoff-modria-judge-judy
-cyber-shoppers.
69.
See supra section I.A; supra note 49.
70.
The empirics thus lend support to Daniel Markovits’s theoretical account of
customer service departments as sites of negotiation rather than adjudication. See MARKOVITS, supra
note 14, at 1320.
71.
Cf. Engstrom, supra note 11 (describing law firms as tort settlement mills).
72.
See Homburg & Furst, supra note 37, at 108; Tor Wallin Andreassen, Antecedents
to Satisfaction with Service Recovery, 34 J. EUROPEAN MARKETING. (2000) 168-71 (“The findings from
the present study illustrate the importance of . . . an ability to create a perception of fairness in the
outcome of the complaint.”).
73.
See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 10 (reviewing the literature on
consumers’ perception of process and concluding procedure may be more important than substantive
outcomes); Andreassen, supra note 72, at 168-71 (concluding based on a reflective measurement model
that for consumers to be satisfied with the resolution, the complaint resolution process must be perceived
as fair); see TYLER, supra note 17 (establishing the importance of procedural justice in the law).
74.
See Stone, supra note 35, at 112.
75.
See Andreassen, supra note 72, at 168-70 (discussing empirical evidence
indicating the importance of consumers being able to express their grievances and a speedy resolution);
Carl L. Saxby et al., Measuring Consumer Perceptions of Procedural Justice in a Complaint Context, 34
J. CONSUMER AFF. 204, 214 (2000) (reviewing the literature on procedural justice in consumer disputes
and concluding consumers care about two-way communications, decision makers’ trustworthiness, and
the extent to which their grievance is understood); Stone, supra note 35, at 112 (reviewing empirical
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First, companies increasingly employ communication tools that make
consumers feel like they have a voice. The Royal Bank of Scotland sums up
many companies’ philosophies, saying in its charter’s complaint resolution
76
section, “We are committed to listening.” Customer service employees are
trained to listen well by asking questions, acknowledging frustrations, and
77
paraphrasing what was heard. Even online forms such as Amazon’s provide
an opportunity for consumers to voice their concerns, with question headings
78
such as “Tell us more about your issue.”
Second, companies have attempted to institutionalize good treatment of
disputants. To accomplish this goal, they even provide customer service
79
representatives with training in emotional intelligence. Studies of the rent-toown business—historically viewed as one of the most problematic industries by
many consumer advocates—suggest people are overall satisfied with their
80
treatment. One found that most consumers who were late on a payment rated
how they were treated as either “good” or “very good,” with only 15% rating
81
their treatment as “poor” or “very poor.”
Third, companies generally prioritize speed. A slow response, even when
otherwise effective, is harmful to the company’s relationship with the
82
consumer. Consequently, companies will typically promise a resolution
83
within a set number of days, rather than months.
research showing that how the customer is treated throughout the process—the person’s dignity—is
important to consumers’ perception of the overall legitimacy of the process).
76.
See We Are Committed to Listening, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND,
https://www.rbs.co.uk/secure/global/customer-charter/default.asp; Robert Johnston & Sandy Mehra,
Best-Practice Complaint Management, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 145, 145 (2002) (concluding best
practice complaint resolution involves soliciting, listening to, and resolving complaints).
77.
Beaujean et al., supra note 40, at 68.
78.
See supra note 66.
79.
Beaujean et al., supra note 40, at 64.
80.
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission on Rent-to-Own Transactions Before the House Financial Services Committee Financial
Institutions
and
Consumer
Credit
Subcommittee,
at
6,
(July
26,
2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade
-commission-rent-own-transactions/110726renttoowntestimony.pdf. The rent-to-own industry is the
subject of one of the most famous consumer protection cases, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law
of the Poor”, 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014).
81.
James M. Lacko et al., Customer Experience with Rent-to-Own Transactions, 21
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 126, 133 (2002).
82.
Gadi Benmark & Dan Singer, Turn Customer Care Into “Social Care” to Break
Away from the Competition, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 19, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/12/turn-customer
-care-into-social.
83.
See eBay Guarantee, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/ebay-money-back-guarantee/
(assuring a resolution within 30 days); Handling Customer Disputes, AMAZON,
https://payments.amazon.com/help/201212320 (noting that if a customer files a dispute the seller “must
respond within 5 business days with the requested information.”). Companies do, however, take greatly
varying amounts of time to respond to consumer complaints. See Ian Ayres et al., Skeletons in the
Database: An Early Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
343, 345-46 (2014) (“[B]ank of America, Citibank, and PNC Bank were all significantly less timely in
responding to complaints than the average financial institution.”).
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Fourth, corporations’ willingness to concede what may not be
84
contractually required likely builds the consumer’s trust. Corporations build
trust in other ways, including joint problem solving during the dispute
85
resolution process and incorporating norms of flexibility.
Finally, corporations advance perceptions of neutrality most clearly when
the corporation is a third-party adjudicator in the hundreds of millions of
86
network trials. Yet even in more bilateral negotiations, such as the customer
87
service context, effective explanations can advance perceptions of neutrality.
88
When deciding against the consumer, companies typically offer explanations.
They use neutral language implying they are on the same side as the consumer,
such as saying “One alternative for you could be . . .” or “I can’t do that
89
because . . .” instead of “You can’t.” Also, between 2003 and 2010, software
end-user license agreements increasingly included provisions explaining
consumers’ state and federal rights, although such provisions are not required
90
by law. It is possible a consumer looking at such a contract provision after the
dispute arose would see the explanation of their rights as a sign that the
corporation is acting more neutrally, in accordance with more balanced
principles of fairness, rather than merely trying to gain an advantage in an
91
adversarial manner. Although some elements of neutrality are clearly missing,
and the topic is in need of further study, corporations’ clauses and general
approach illustrate ways in which they may advance perceptions of neutrality,
and thus of procedural justice.

84.
See Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 10-11 (“[c]ompensation may serve to reestablish the potential decrease in confidence that the consumer may attach to the retailer as a
consequence of the perceived loss.”); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice
in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 473 (2008) (finding trust matters even in bilateral negotiations).
85.
See Bernstein, Procurement Contracts, supra note 21 (summarizing the literature
on how trust may emerge in business relationships).
86.
See infra section I.C.
87.
See TYLER, supra note 17, at 516.
88.
See Angela Littwin, Why Process Complaints? Then and Now, 87 TEMP. L. REV.
895, 944 (2015) (reporting that companies close with an explanation about three-fourths of the
complaints received by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from consumers, though noting that
these complaints may not be representative).
89.
See Kristin Robertson, Saying No: How to Deliver Bad News to a Customer, KR
CONSULTING (Apr. 2014) http://www.krconsulting.com/saying-no-how-to-deliver-bad-news-to-a
-customer.
90.
See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 33, at 258 (finding that between 2003
and 2010 “[t]he probability that a EULA informs consumers of their state and federal law rights rose by
5.7%.”).
91.
For example, transparency and a lack of bias contribute to perceptions of
neutrality. See TOM TYLER & RICK TRINKNER, LEGAL SOCIALIZATION IN AN ERA OF MISTRUST:
FOSTERING THE POPULAR LEGITIMACY OF THE LAW (manuscript at 23) (forthcoming). While consumers
may not be able to see corporations’ biased decisions because of the lack of transparency, corporations’
internal processes do a poorer job of offering those components of neutrality. See infra section II.B.
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3. Procedural Experimentalism
92

Businesses learn and change through procedural experimentalism. Most
immediately, because the financial stakes are so high, it is best practice for
corporations to assess how well they resolve disputes and adjust accordingly.
Moreover, companies increasingly view complaints as sources of information
about how to improve their core business and thereby prevent disputes.
Corporations have thus developed the type of dynamic feedback loop between
disputes and policymaking to which the public system aspires.
Improving dispute resolution begins with collecting and analyzing
information. Companies solicit feedback through ubiquitous post-dispute
satisfaction surveys. They study whether consumers continue to patronize the
93
business after disputes. Analysts also quantify how complaint processes
94
contribute to the company’s bottom line.
Companies then adjust their behavior in response. Employee
compensation often depends on how well the individual and the company
95
resolve complaints. Businesses also regularly innovate complaint processes
based on analytics. Call center managers test ways of communicating a
problem resolution, and then compare which one produced the highest
96
customer satisfaction. More boldly, they experiment with entirely new dispute
mechanisms. eBay, for example, developed crowd-sourcing adjudication in
which a jury of randomly selected buyers and sellers issues the final judgment
97
on a dispute.
Complaint departments also feed what they learn into other parts of the
98
organization to prevent disputes. If the complaint process indicates that
certain contract clauses or sales practices lead to a high volume of complaints,
executives are increasingly pressured to reengineer the product or practices
99
when doing so might increase profits due to fewer complaints. For example,

92.
See, e.g., Stone, supra note 35, at 115 (“Service recovery is not just a ‘damagecontrol’ mechanism affecting the ‘shop floor’ level, but part of a company’s strategic planning to ensure
that its offerings are continuously improved.”). Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (identifying democratic
experimentalism in the governmental context).
93.
See Rule, supra note 19, at 771.
94.
See Benmark & Singer, supra note 82.
95.
See Stone, supra note 35, at 115-16 (mentioning companies linking employee
salaries to individual customer service metrics, and to how well the company measures up to
competitors in terms of complaint resolution).
96.
Rob Markey & Fred Reichheld, From Feedback to Action, BAIN INSIGHTS (Sept.
21, 2012), http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/from-feedback-to-action.aspx.
97.
Anjanette H. Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution
in the Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 357, 382 (discussing eBay and Alibaba’s use of users to
form panels or “community courts” to decide cases).
98.
See, e.g., Stone, supra note 35, at 110 (concluding that the data collected in
handling customer disputes “[m]ust be fed back to policy makers whose performance partly dependents
on these data.”).
99.
See Markey & Reichheld, supra note 96.
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JetBlue’s complaint department heard from a disgruntled passenger who had
been charged an additional bike fee even though the bike folded up into a
suitcase—a seemingly unjust rule. Less than twenty-four hours later, JetBlue
100
had updated its policy to no longer charge extra for fold-up bikes.
Many companies also seek dispute information even when the customer
101
has not reached out directly. Barclays Bank, for example, proactively asks
consumers to submit complaints through leaflets and posters in its branches,
102
and on statements mailed to customers.
Similarly, companies ranging from
Wells Fargo to Pizza Hut monitor social networks not for individual issues but
103
for broader opportunities to improve customer satisfaction.
Of course, there are limits on how much a company will adjust its
policies. Individual cases are handled with precedent in mind. As the head of
JetBlue’s customer service has stated, “It’s really easy to want to jump to the
rescue when we see a customer expressing concern . . . But we always try to
104
think about the long-term implications as well.”
Overall, however,
corporations are increasingly developing feedback loops that enable aggrieved
consumers to influence dispute resolution policy. And surveys suggest
105
satisfaction with customer service is overall improving.
4. Tailored Outcomes and Automated Decisions
106

Corporate complaint processing is now often highly automated. This
107
automation can significantly reduce the costs of dispute resolution. Perhaps
more importantly from a dispute design perspective, it enables tailored
decisionmaking.
When a consumer reaches out about a dispute, computer algorithms
typically analyze all relevant internal and external information available to
108
estimate two main variables: behavior and net worth. The behavioral analysis

100.
See A Day in the Life: Social Media, JetBlue Blue Tales Blog, JETBLUE (Jan. 19,
http://blog.jetblue.com/index.php/2012/01/19/a-day-in-the-life-social-media.
101.
See Johnston & Mehra, supra note 76, at 147-49.
102.
See id.
103.
See, e.g., Martins, supra note 65.
104.
See A Day in the Life, supra note 100.
105.
See ‘Your Call Is Important to Us’ Or Is It?, CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 2015)
(citing data from the Better Business Bureau suggesting fewer complaints, including in nine of the ten
most troublesome industries, and offering original survey data suggesting fewer consumers were
agitated compared to 2011).
106.
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 20,050,192,884 (filed May 3, 2005),
https://www.google.com/patents/US20050192884 (describing a system in which “[a] processor handles
the chargeback inquiry so the merchant does not need to respond to chargeback inquiry requests.”).
107.
The leading provider of automated dispute systems, Modria, has stated that up to
90% of cases are resolved through technology alone. See How It Works, MODRIA,
http://modria.com/how-it-works (last visited April 24, 2015).
108.
See Julie Weed, For Uber, Airbnb and Other Companies, Customer Ratings Go
Both Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2014, (examining companies’ collection of data about consumers in
various industries).
2012),
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considers the consumer’s past behavior, such as the number of prior
109
complaints.
This helps to deter return abuse. It also predicts the likely
response for that particular consumer if the request is granted or denied.
Companies scientifically test how consumers respond to different levels of
redress, using all predictive variables available. This tells them the likelihood
of losing similar customers in the future if full, partial, or no concession is
110
made. Companies are also integrating into their business decisions means of
assessing a consumer’s online social influence over peers, such as the number
111
of Twitter followers or Facebook friends. Incorporation of such practices
112
into dispute resolution is in its early phases.
Algorithms merge these behavioral analyses with an estimate of the
consumer’s buying power. This helps predict, based on internal data and
external information such as the consumer’s e-commerce purchasing history at
113
various companies, how profitable a consumer is likely to be. As Bank of
America’s patent on its automated complaint handling software explains, the
server may consider information such as the “profitability of the account” and
“external factors, such as the personal relatives of the customers who are also
114
account holders at the bank.”
This sophisticated and instantaneous analysis often decides much of what
happens for a given dispute. When a consumer inputs account information into
the online form or interactive phone menu, the algorithm may route the call to a
115
particular department. This routing is aimed at saving phone time by better
fitting the company’s expertise to the dispute. It also determines whether the
caller is routed to an elite complaint handling department—with an internal

109.
See U.S. Patent No. 7,797,212, supra note 62 (describing a Bank of America
refund tool that considers, among other factors, “[p]rior fees and refunds associated with the account.”).
110.
Telephone Interview with N.B. (June 12, 2015).
111.
See, e.g., Nate Cullerton, Behavioral Credit Scoring, 101 GEO. L.J. 807, 816
(2013).
112.
Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015).
113.
See Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers’ Buying Power, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2012, at BU1; Telephone Interview with N.B. (June 12, 2015).
114.
See U.S. Patent No. 7,797,212, supra note 62; Thomas Reeves, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/thomas-reeves/6/715/853 (last visited February 8, 2016) (former Bank of
America employee describing responsibilities as including “Approved staff submissions for client
refunds according to bank policy using Refund Request Tool.”). Discussion of the use of family
members’ wealth to decide remedies is absent from the literature and thus it is difficult to know how
broadly representative this example is. However, the use of such information is part of a more general
phenomenon of companies using a variety of personal data to discriminate among consumers, and the
use of information for deciding remedies is one of many applications. See Amy J. Schmitz, Secret
Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from “Have-Nots”, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1411, 1420 (2014) (highlighting companies broad use of information about family and social networks
and implying, but not stating, such information could be used for deciding remedies).
115.
See, e.g., Jen Wieczner, 10 Things Customer-Service Reps Won’t Tell You,
MARKET WATCH (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-customerservice-reps
-wont-say-1326819855640 (describing how Bank of America has twenty customer service phone
numbers that enables it to route customers to the employee best situated to deal with a particular
complaint).
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name such as Executive Customer Relations—or is relegated to an “overflow”
116
call center, without the customer knowing.
117
These automated systems also increasingly administer the complaint. A
simple version of this is the case of JPMorgan Chase, which recently
implemented an algorithm that would automatically refund any online fee
118
refund request under $50 without any human involvement.
Likewise, large
retail chains use software to monitor item returns and deny requests that they
deem problematic, leaving the employee operating the cash register powerless
119
to override. More generally, one of the principal goals of automated decision
making is to reduce employee discretion, and thereby reduce inconsistency and
120
emotionally driven decisions.
A noteworthy feature of these tailored decisions is that consumers are
typically unaware of the decision-making process. They rarely know that their
income, or their families’ income, was factored into the decision of whether to
provide relief. Nor are they likely aware that a computer made the decision to
deny a refund, and not the person on the phone or a human sender of the refund
email.
If firms’ internal processes are the courts of the future, judicial decisions
are increasingly based on consumers’ characteristics rather than simply on the
facts of the case, and the judges of the future are increasingly digital.
C. The Corporation as Third-Party Adjudicator
When settlement processes fail and the parties continue to pursue their
grievances, the dispute may proceed to adjudication. The most common form
of adjudication puts the consumer-facing corporation in a third-party role
between buyer and seller. This is a form of network trial, because the
adjudicating company originally connected the disputing parties, either

116.
See Singer, supra note 113 (reporting that electronic customer scores “can
determine whether a customer is routed promptly to an attentive service agent or relegated to an
overflow call center.”).
117.
See U.S. Patent No. 20,120,185,400
(filed Jan. 13, 2011),
http://www.google.com/patents/US20120185400 (describing a software program that grants or denies
fee refunds without any employee involvement necessary).
118.
Interview with J.E. (May 22, 2015) (current J.P. Morgan Chase employee
describing system). Because the program prompted too large a number of consumers to request refunds,
the bank subsequently updated the program to make it somewhat more difficult for consumers to obtain
refunds. See id. See also Sood & Pinipe, supra note 18, at 7 (describing financial institutions deciding
not to investigate to maintain customer satisfaction or because the amount disputed is too small).
119.
See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Some Shoppers Find Fewer Happy Returns, WASH.
POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at A1.
120.
See
U.S.
Patent
No.
7,797,212
(filed
Oct
31,
2006),
http://www.google.com/patents/US7797212 (explaining that an automated customer service tool
benefits Bank of America by reducing reliance on employee discretion).
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financially or digitally. Network trials are fast-growing and already account for
121
hundreds of millions of disputes annually.
eBay’s approach is illustrative of many online companies’ roles as dispute
intermediaries between buyers and sellers. eBay built a Resolution Center to
122
handle its over sixty million annual disputes.
This system uses software to
ask for information, such as the details of the dispute and the buyer’s preferred
123
outcome. The system then encourages the participants to message each other
directly. If direct communication fails, the issue is escalated to the Resolution
124
Center, a member of which makes a decision on the case.
After making a final decision, online intermediaries mostly limit their
125
remedies to a refund for the consumer. Failure to comply leads to suspension
from the online community, which is a powerful enforcement mechanism for
large sellers who often rely on sites such as Amazon and eBay for a substantial
126
portion of their revenues.
The growth of financial intermediation has also increasingly put financial
institutions in an adjudicatory role between buyers and sellers. When
consumers purchase goods or services with a credit card, federal law requires
credit card issuers such as American Express in many instances to refund the
127
consumer’s purchase if it is disputed. The issuer must then investigate the
consumer’s dispute by collecting the appropriate information. This is called a
chargeback, because the amount disputed is taken out of the seller’s account.
Newer financial intermediaries such as PayPal offer similar chargeback
128
functions. To enforce the verdict, in addition to community expulsion the
129
intermediary company can freeze or automatically deduct funds in accounts.

121.
See supra note 18 (calculating that a range of fifty million to one hundred
million chargebacks annually would be a “conservative range.”). eBay alone handles sixty million
disputes annually. See supra note 4. Yet eBay is only one of many large companies that play such a role.
122.
See Del Duca et al., supra note 4, at 205 (reporting sixty million disputes
handled by eBay annually).
123.
See id. at 206-07.
124.
See id.
125.
See id. at 206.
126.
See
Buyer
Support
Program,
AMAZON,
https://payments.amazon.com/sdui/sdui/about?nodeId=6025 (“Any seller that fails to cooperate in good
faith to resolve a buyer’s complaint may have its account privileges restricted or terminated.”); Amy
Martinez, Amazon Sellers Complain of Tied-up Payments, Account Shutdowns, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
17, 2012.
127.
Chargebacks were required starting in 1968 with the passage of the Truth in
Lending Act. See Raymond & Stemler, supra note 94, at 379.
128.
Both PayPal and credit card companies first attempt to encourage the parties to
communicate directly before ultimately rendering a verdict on the case if necessary. See Raymond &
Stemler, supra note 127, at 380 (describing PayPal as “providing for chargebacks when necessary” and
concluding that as a result “[o]utcomes of the dispute resolution process are easily and simply enforced
via the payment mechanism.”).
129.
See, e.g., AMAZON PAYMENTS, supra note 126 (“[A]mazon Payments may place
a hold on funds in a seller’s account if the seller does not respond timely to a dispute or does not honor a
commitment made to resolve a dispute within a reasonable amount of time.”).
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In both these contexts, the intermediary does receive a cut of whatever
sale is being disputed, and this small fraction of the dispute would potentially
be refunded if the corporation decides in favor of the consumer. The third-party
company also wants to encourage consumers to continue using its services.
Thus, it is not a completely disinterested party. Yet the intermediary is a neutral
party in that it did not directly participate in the disputed incident.
These processes are in need of greater study to draw strong conclusions.
However, preliminary evidence indicates that they work for buyers and
130
131
sellers. Consumers rarely complain about chargebacks. eBay found that
consumers who went through its internal adjudication were significantly more
likely to shop at the website in the future than customers who did not go
through any dispute process or who went through an outside dispute resolution
132
mechanism.
At a basic level, though, it is important to understand that these
adjudicatory processes are fundamentally different from arbitration and from
the traditional customer service department. Whereas scholars worry about
133
anti-consumer arbitrator bias because corporations bring arbitrators business,
the corporate intermediary’s business depends on those millions of consumers
it is adjudicating. Also, arbitrators and public judges engage in qualitatively
134
similar decisionmaking and apply the law to cases. In contrast, intermediary
corporations’ decision makers follow internal company guidelines and are
135
usually not lawyers.
And unlike customer service departments, which are
consumers’ opposing party, intermediary corporations are usually separate
136
legal entities from consumers’ opposing parties.

130.
See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for
New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 691 (2000) (“Although good empirical data is
lacking, it appears that the [chargeback] system satisfies both consumers and merchants.”).
131.
See Del Duca et al., supra note 4, at 208 (noting consumers rarely complain
about chargebacks).
132.
See Rule, supra note 19, at 774 (finding consumers were more likely to shop at
eBay after having their disputes resolved through the company’s resolution center, but when consumers
chose instead to dispute through the credit card chargeback system, buyers were no more likely to use
the website than if a dispute had never occurred). The methodology used does not allow for causality to
be conclusively established.
133.
See, e.g., William W. Park, Arbitrator Bias, 12 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT.,
(2015), http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2265 (“No one with a dog
in the fight should judge the competition. . . . Consequently, few tasks present the vital urgency of
establishing standards for evaluating the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.”)
134.
See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging Lite: How Arbitrators Make and Use
Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2012).
135.
In the tort context, the settlement of disputes by non-lawyers in “settlement
mills” raises questions about the unauthorized practice of law. See Engstrom, supra note 11, at 841.
136.
The legal relationship is, however, somewhat muddled. See, e.g., Brishen
Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015) (discussing open questions
about whether Uber drivers are employees).
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D. The Corporation as Reputation-Based Enforcement Mechanism
Reputation-based sanctions and network governance have served crucial
functions in business-to-business private legal systems such as in the diamond,
137
cotton, and grain industries.
Similarly, rural neighbors in some parts of the
country resort to negative gossip as the most common first step to enforce
138
breached norms regarding trespass of cattle. In those systems, both informal
mechanisms, such as gossip, and formal mechanisms, such as information
139
bureaus, play important roles. The consumer legal system is evolving toward
a similar reliance on reputation-based governance mechanisms.
Consumer markets’ informal reputation mechanisms come not from closeknit gossip networks but through a variety of websites designed for consumer
reviews, such as Yelp, as well as more general purpose websites—such as
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube—that consumers nonetheless widely use to
give feedback about companies.
Individual disputes handled badly can also go viral. When United Airlines
baggage handlers broke David Carroll’s guitar, the musician spent nine months
attempting to convince customer representatives to fix the instrument. After
what he described as repeated indifference, he recorded and posted a music
video on YouTube—“United Breaks Guitars”—that received over 15 million
140
views.
United ultimately not only offered to pay for damages, but also
141
improved its agents’ ability to escalate claims internally.
Numerous other
complaints, such as one customer’s video of a three-hour failed attempt to
142
cancel Comcast cable services, have reached millions of viewers.
Consumers also use these sites for direct advocacy about specific dispute
resolution policies. For example, when retailers such as Best Buy, Macy’s, and
Toys “R” Us introduced a restocking fee of up to 15% for returned items,
backlashes on Twitter and Facebook helped prompt companies retracting those

137.
See Bernstein, Private Ordering, supra note 21, at 1.
138.
See Ellickson, supra note 21, at 677.
139.
See Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra note 21, at 1745 (describing the cotton
industry’s successful efforts to make “reputation-based nonlegal sanctions (like negative gossip, which
may lead to refusal to deal) an important force in the industry.”); Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra
note 21, at 121-22 (detailing the use of reputation bonds in the diamond industry).
140.
See
United
Breaks
Guitars,
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YGc4zOqozo.
141.
See Brett Snyder, United Aggressively Responds to “United Breaks Guitars Part
2,” CBS MONEY WATCH (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/united-aggressively-responds
-to-united-breaks-guitars-part-2.
142.
See, e.g., Comcast Left Me on Hold for 3+ Hours—Until It Closed, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 15, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/15/technology/comcast-three-hour-hold
(describing how photographer Aaron Spain videoed himself on hold for over three hours, until after
Comcast had closed, and before long had over one million hits); Comcast Service Disconnection,
SOUNDCLOUD https://soundcloud.com/ryan-block-10/comcastic-service (last visited February 9, 2016)
(sharing an audio recording of a customer’s attempt to cancel Comcast services, which received over 6
million hits).
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143

policies. Similarly, in 2014, General Mills announced that those who bought
its products or used its social media were agreeing to settle disputes in
arbitration. A social media outcry ensued, and within days the company
144
retracted the policy.
More formal private mechanisms for feedback have also developed. These
sites are specifically designed to aggregate reputational information, typically
into something like a five-star rating system. Some, such as Ripoff Report, take
an antagonistic approach seemingly geared toward shaming the company into
145
146
defending itself publicly. Others, such as Yelp, are more neutral.
The array of reputational websites matter mostly because they can
influence consumers’ decisions. According to one recent survey, almost 70% of
consumers rely on online reviews before purchasing a product, and that number
147
is growing. Yelp is one of the most visited sites in the United States and is
148
used by almost one hundred million Americans, or about one in three.
The
Better Business Bureau’s ratings website has over ten million visits each
149
month. Also, consumers trust online reviews—particularly those conveying
150
negative information.
The mere fact that reputation websites influence consumers suggests that
rationally acting corporations would pay attention to the sites. Further evidence
of these websites’ influence comes from the behavior of consumer companies,
which have developed groups to manage and monitor social media
151
complaints. The fact that individual complaints can go viral or lead to online
reviews that permanently damage a company’s reputation forces companies to
take extra caution with individual consumer disputes—assuming companies
cannot distinguish consumers who will complain. It also influences how
executives design dispute resolution processes.
143.
See Miguel Bustillo, Retailers Loosen Up on Returns—Tough Policies of Recent
Years Spurred Consumer Complaints and Often Became Impediment to Sales, WALL ST. J., Dec 27,
2010, at B.1.
144.
See Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses Itself on Consumers’ Right to Sue,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at A.17.
145.
See RIPOFF REPORT, http://www.ripoffreport.com.
146.
See YELP, www.yelp.com.
147.
See Ashlee Kieler, Nearly 70% Of Consumers Rely On Online Reviews Before
Making A Purchase, CONSUMERIST (June 3, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/06/03/nearly-70-of
-consumers-rely-on-online-reviews-before-making-a-purchase.
148.
See How Popular Is Yelp.com?, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/yelp.com
(listing Yelp as the 32nd most visited U.S. website) (last visited February 9, 2016); Yelp Network,
QUANTCAST, https://www.quantcast.com/yelp.com (estimating monthly U.S. unique Yelp visitors at
107.7 million) (last visited February 9, 2016).
149.
See How Popular Is bbb.org?, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/bbb.org
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
150.
See Why Ratings and Reviews Suck and How To Save Them,
SOCIALMEDIATODAY,
http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/why-ratings-and-reviews-suck-and
-how-save-them-0 (Feb. 13, 2012) (discussing the high trust consumers place in online reviews); Luo &
Homburg, supra note 36, at 31-32 (discussing empirical research suggesting that negative information
has a stronger effect on buyers than positive feedback).
151.
See, e.g. Martins, supra note 65.
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The extent to which reputation-based sanctions enable a private ordering
152
will vary by industry and over time. Overall, however, reputation websites
thus provide a market-monitoring mechanism for problematic dispute
resolution practices within corporations. Although few consumers ever
consider any particular dispute resolution practice or clause ex ante, if a clause
violates norms of fairness, it could negatively impact online reputation scores
through the ratings of those subjected to it ex post. The simple aggregate
reputation score of, say, two out of five stars enables consumers who would not
even think to look at the details of lengthy contracts to nonetheless incorporate
153
the implications of those contracts into their purchase decisions.
II. Promises and Pitfalls of the Corporation as Courthouse
Existing institutional analyses of privatized dispute resolution have mostly
compared arbitration to the courts. However, the key dichotomy is not between
arbitration and courts—which have been shown to be similar based on many
important metrics such as application of legal precedent—but rather between
those formal mechanisms and more informal ones such as corporations’
154
internal processes. This shift in perspective reveals a distinct set of promises
and pitfalls in privatized dispute resolution.
A. The Promise of the Corporation as Courthouse
1. Low-cost Access to Redress
If the literature is correct that litigants ultimately “want [dispute
155
resolution] routes that are quick, cheap, and relatively stress-free,”
the
corporation as courthouse may deliver on what matters most to consumers.
Consumers can initiate the customer service process in a few seconds by
tweeting, or in a few minutes by calling or chatting online. They can similarly
156
start a network trial by filling out a quick dispute form on the Web. Although
public courts are becoming increasingly automated, initiating a case in the
public legal system requires navigating a dizzying set of procedures and filling
152.
See Richman, supra note 21 (concluding that a shift in the structure of the
diamond industry weakened reputation-based sanctions that had once sustained cooperation); Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s
“Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 184 (2011) (finding that in the
software industry few consumers consult online reviews before making purchases).
153.
This is so because most consumers will not read through all of the reviews, and
instead will look at the aggregate score.
154.
On the similarity of decision making by courts and arbitrators, see, e.g.,
Weidemaier, supra note 134, at 1091.
155.
See Engstrom, supra note 11, at 836 (quoting HAZEL GENN ET AL., PATHS TO
JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 254–55 (1999)).
156.
See, e.g., Nick Clements (@npclements), TWITTER (June 5, 2015, 8:47 AM
EST), https://twitter.com/npclements/status/606849904070283264 (reporting a successful chargeback
case through J.P. Morgan Chase taking less than five minutes).
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out complicated forms. Additionally, court processes typically require
appearing in person at least once, if not multiple times. Finally, corporations’
dispute processes are free, whereas even small claims courts have prohibitive
157
fees for most small-value complaints. These factors, and what is known
about network trials, indicate that private processes increase the likelihood that
158
consumers will pursue claims.
Once the dispute process is initiated, customer service calls can also lead
to settlements in minutes, and network trials typically take a few hours or
159
160
days. By contrast, small claims and arbitration cases take months.
The private system likely provides further savings to consumers,
corporations, and government in three main ways. First, both consumers and
corporations avoid lawyers’ fees because settlement-oriented market forces,
rather than adjudicatory legal devices, provide the principal mechanism for
governance. Second, the private system is more sophisticated at avoiding nonmeritorious claims. The public legal system cares about frivolous lawsuits, but
161
has done a poor job of preventing them. By contrast, companies invest in
advanced software systems to deter frivolous complaints. Bad-faith returns may
162
cost goods retailers alone up to an estimated fifteen billion dollars annually.
This provides strong economic incentives to companies to prevent such abuse.
Third, corporations lower costs through highly automated dispute resolution
163
processes.
These broad savings on dispute resolution would be expected to
164
advance consumer welfare, such as by lowering prices.

157.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, Arbitration Study, at section 4.3
(2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf
(finding small claims fees of $63 to $112 in Philadelphia Municipal Courts).
158.
See Nancy A. Welsh & David B. Lipsky, “Moving the Ball Forward” in
Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2013, at 16 (mentioning a
Federal Trade Commission study finding that chargeback availability is correlated with higher incidence
of consumer claims).
159.
See, e.g., Del Duca et al., supra note 4, at 208 (reporting that eBay’s
adjudication delivers verdicts within forty-eight hours).
160.
See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 3, at 81, 101 (finding contractual cases
take 21.5 months between complaint and resolution in state courts and estimating the average consumer
arbitration at six to eight months).
161.
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1313-14 (2002) (adopting thirty percent as the hypothetical
figure for the percent of class action cases filed that are frivolous and calling for reforms that would
deny certification).
162.
See Cha, supra note 119.
163.
See Maurits Barendrecht & Christopher Honeyman, Dispute Resolution:
Existing Business Models and Looming Disruptions, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2014, at 20-21
(describing gradual adoption by many public courts of online dispute mechanisms); supra Section I.B.4.
(discussing highly automated corporate dispute processes).
164.
The relationship between mandatory arbitration and lower prices is debated. But
overall, in competitive markets, industry-wide savings would be expected to result in lower prices. See
Orley Ashenfelter et al., Identifying the Firm-Specific Cost Pass-Through Rate, at 14-15 (F.T.C.,
Working Paper No. 217, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/identifying-firm-specific-cost-pass-through
-rate.
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2. Greater Value for Those Who Complain
Corporate processes have the potential to provide effective substantive
outcomes for many consumers. At a broad level, because of the cost savings
and removal of lawyers’ fees, it is theoretically possible that corporations could
pay less overall for dispute resolution while paying consumers more in
settlements. The data do not exist to draw firm conclusions on this matter.
However, corporations do probably provide more substantive redress for those
who actually complain.
Corporations arguably provide more substantive redress simply by
providing greater access to redress. Most consumers for small-value
transaction-based disputes would never bring a case in court or in arbitration,
but do complain to corporations and obtain redress. While the substantive
results will vary, even legal scholars highly critical of corporations’ complaint
handling acknowledge that when consumers push, they often get what they
165
want.
Putting aside the issue of access, even some consumers who would have
brought individual lawsuits or been part of class actions fare better in the
corporation as courthouse. This follows from the fact that customer service
departments—as well as network trials such as those run by Uber and
American Express—regularly grant consumers’ requests even if no legal claim
166
exists. In addition, the majority of online chargebacks are not even disputed
167
by merchants. Finally, assuming that consumers weigh substantive outcomes
in their overall satisfaction, it can be inferred that those who enter network
trials do well substantively: Consumers rarely complain about chargebacks, and
eBay found that consumers gave the company even more business after going
168
through its adjudication process. Although more studies of outcomes are
needed, the available data provide little evidence that network trials offer less
169
redress than courts or arbitrators. And because consumers pay no court,
arbitration, or legal fees, they keep all of whatever award is granted.

165.
See, e.g., Nader, supra note 13, at 1012.
166.
See supra Section I.B.1 (discussing customer service departments); Interview
with M.H. (July 25, 2015) (stating that American Express grants chargeback requests to most valuable
customers even when it does not recover from the merchant); Interview with J.B. (July 26, 2015)
(stating that Uber regularly grants complaining consumers’ requests even if they have no legal claim).
167.
See Tom Cain, Risky Business: Best Practices for Managing Cardholder Dispute
and Chargeback Processes in Challenging Times, TSYS MANAGED SERVICES 4 (2012),
http://tsys.com/Assets/TSYS/downloads/wp_risky-business-best-practices-for-dispute-and
-chargeback.pdf (citing an industry study finding that if e-commerce merchants challenge thirty-five to
forty percent of chargebacks it is a “high percentage”).
168.
See Rule, supra note 19.
169.
See infra Section II.B.3 (discussing the distributional implications of corporate
complaint systems).
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3. Direct Accountability
A frequent and powerful criticism of privatized dispute resolution is that it
lacks accountability. This critique identifies an important shortcoming.
However, unlike arbitration, the broader private consumer legal system offers
170
strong informal accountability mechanisms.
One primary concern about accountability in arbitration is the absence of
an appeals process. By contrast, corporations’ internal dispute processes offer
several avenues for appeal. Consumers denied redress by a customer service
representative can appeal to higher authorities within the organization, even
171
sometimes obtaining redress by writing directly to the CEO. Third-party
corporations also provide appeals. Consumers who are turned away by the
customer service department can later obtain redress after bringing their case to
172
reputation websites or to the intermediary credit card company.
While the frequency and success rate of most of these appeals processes
remain understudied, compared to more formal appeals processes they are
173
easier to initiate and appear to be widely used. Moreover, these appeals
processes have staying power. One hotel recently invoked a clause making
guests pay $500 for every negative review left online. When word spread, its
Yelp rating quickly plummeted to one star out of five, and the hotel ended the
174
policy.
The appeals themselves, and often consumer complaints, are also to some
extent held accountable. Amazon reviewers can rate reviews as unhelpful, thus
175
lessening their visibility.
When Harvard Business School Professor Ben
Edelman aggressively complained to a small business about being overcharged
by four dollars on a Chinese food takeout order, asking for treble damages
based on Massachusetts consumer protection statutes, he was forced to
176
apologize after a strong Internet backlash.

170.
It is also possible that privatization increases more formal political
accountability in some contexts. See Jack M. Beerman, Administrative Law-Like Obligations on
Private[ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002).
171.
See, e.g., Paul Michael, How I Got Two CEOs To Listen to My Complaints,
WISEBREAD, http://www.wisebread.com/how-i-got-two-ceos-to-listen-to-my-complaints (explaining
how one customer obtained redress for separate disputes by contacting the CEOs of Firestone and
Deluxe Rentacar); Wieczner, supra note 115 (mentioning how, after customer service turned her away,
one Apple customer wrote a complaint letter to then-CEO Steve Jobs and received a new iPod).
172.
See supra Section I.C. & I.D.
173.
See supra Section II.A.1 for a discussion of the ease of access of corporate
dispute resolution mechanisms, of which appeals are a subset. Also, consumers collectively use thirdparty reputation websites and credit card companies hundreds of millions of times annually, suggesting
they are often used for appeals. See supra Sections I.C & I.D.
174.
See, e.g., Jackie Huba, Lessons From the Hotel That Fines Customers $500 For
Negative Online Reviews, FORBES, Aug. 4, 2014, at 13.
175.
See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 42, 60 (2015).
176.
See Elizabeth Barber, A Harvard Professor Launched an Epic Rant Over an
Extra $4 on his Chinese Takeout Bill, TIME, Dec. 10, 2014.
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Despite some self-governance of consumer behavior, appeals in the
informal system often favor the consumer. Once the corporation grants a
refund, it would be unusual for the corporation to appeal. In contrast, judicial
appeals can benefit either the corporation or the consumer, and likely favor the
177
party with more resources.
Thus, since criticism about a lack of appeal is
often based on concern about consumers’ rights, this concern is mitigated in the
private consumer legal system by the fact that informal appeals are
disproportionately available to the consumer.
Moving beyond the issue of appeals, in some ways private dispute
178
processes offer more accountability than do courts. As discussed above,
corporations monitor the satisfaction levels of customers after the complaint is
resolved. They update their substantive and procedural policies regularly in a
dynamic feedback loop. They experiment with and innovate their procedures in
179
response to customer feedback.
No remotely commensurate feedback mechanism, innovation, or process
oversight exists in courthouses. Litigants cannot choose among courthouses or
180
judges to the same extent that they can among corporations.
Nor is loyalty
particularly valued; indeed, given the backlog in most courts, it is almost
institutionally advantageous to overburdened court employees if consumers
decide not to bring future suits as a result of bad experiences. This means that
consumers have little opportunity to influence public courts through exit, voice
181
and loyalty.
With the exception of elected judges in some jurisdictions,
courts are largely insulated from direct accountability to their constituents.
It is true that consumer disputes are mostly resolved without a formal
judicial appeals process and thus lack a key accountability mechanism available
in public courts. However, the private consumer legal system can offer strong
accountability through informal appeals and direct responsiveness to
182
consumers’ interests.
177.
See, e.g., Donald R. Songer et al., Do the “Haves” Come out Ahead over Time?
Applying Galanter’s Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 33 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 811, 830 (1999) (finding advantages for parties with greater resources, but noting further research
is needed).
178.
See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic
Change, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (2007) (arguing more generally that organizational alternative dispute
resolution processes can provide forms of accountability “from the linkage of individual and systemic
conflict resolution.”).
179.
See supra Section I.B.3.
180.
The main exception is the occasional forum shopping for more sophisticated
litigants in high-value disputes.
181.
Cf. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing the
role of exit, voice, and loyalty in organizations). If the organization in question is the piece of litigation,
rather than the court, consumers do have recourse to exit, voice, and loyalty.
182.
In this regard, consumer corporations have brought a form of voice and selfgovernance that scholars have advocated more broadly for corporations. See, e.g., ROGERS ET AL., supra
note 16, at 132 (advocating a collaborative approach to dispute systems design); Katharina Pistor,
Multinational Corporations as Regulators and Central Planners: Implications for Citizens’ Voice in
CORPORATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP, 246 (Greg Urban, ed., U. Penn. Press, 2014) (arguing for “Bringing
voice and principles of self-governance into the [multinational corporation] space. . .”).
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4. Truth, Justice, and Community
Society has interests in its dispute system that go beyond those that can be
183
monetized.
Perhaps the most prominent among these are truth, justice, and
community. The private consumer dispute system, in some regards, advances
these ideals.
Promoting truth and justice is the most prominent justification for the
184
adversary legal system.
Scholars have often challenged the adversary
185
system’s ability to deliver on this promise. Given unequal representation in
the courts, “a system of adjudication that truly promoted truth and justice in
dispute resolution would permit far less adversary assertiveness than the current
186
system allows.” These concerns carry additional weight in the contractual
consumer context due to the strong resource imbalance between consumers and
corporations. Moreover, because concentrated business groups can heavily
187
influence the legislative process, even a system that flawlessly applied the
law could produce unjust outcomes.
The corporation as courthouse offers an alternative. Contract law can be
seen as embodying an ideal of collaboration that is at the heart of modern
188
economic and political institutions.
As such, contracts are more than
instruments for wealth generation and reflect, in a certain sense, norms of
189
community and an essential component of coexistence. In a mass-contracting
age, customer service departments serve as the principal site for negotiations
between consumers and corporations. They consequently offer, as Daniel
Markovits puts it, “potential to function as sites of social solidarity—as analogs
190
to the village market.”
This Article’s analysis suggests that corporations are moving towards that
vision, not only through their customer service departments but more broadly in
their various court-like roles. This is so even if it makes no sense that the
corporation would intrinsically value community or norms of collaboration.
Instead, those norms are brought into the system in two main ways. Most
183.
See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 16, at 201 (discussing a broader set of goals and
interests in dispute systems).
184.
See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of
Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 449 (2010) (describing the most prominent
justification of the adversary system as the argument that “adjudication tracks truth and justice.”).
185.
See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement
Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 74-77 (2011); Markovits, supra note 184, at 449-51 (arguing that
the adversary system does not ensure truth and justice).
186.
See Markovits, supra note 184, at 450.
187.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory As Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1565, 1570 (1995).
188.
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1421
(2004). Scholars have often interpreted contract law as embodying moral principles such as freedom,
harm, and welfare. See id.
189.
It follows that there may be moral reasons for enforcing contracts. See
Markovits, supra note 188, at 1422.
190.
See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1321.
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significantly, because corporations are increasingly attempting to provide what
191
consumers value in dispute resolution, those processes would be expected to
evolve toward procedures that reflect community norms. Additionally,
employees must ultimately exercise discretion in a great number of dispute
resolution cases. Employees’ social norms influence how they exercise that
192
discretion, such as whether they comply with company policies.
It should thus not be surprising that the corporation as courthouse
increasingly operates under principles of justice and collaboration. Elements of
procedural justice such as skilled listening, respectful treatment, and
trustworthiness create a sense of connectedness that promotes ongoing
193
relations. This would explain the counter-intuitive finding that following
well-handled internal disputes, consumers give the company more business
194
than before, even when consumers’ requests are denied. This is true not only
in the customer service negotiation, but when the corporation acts as network
195
judge.
The centrality of community can also be seen in language and sanctions.
The use of expulsion from the online community as an enforcement mechanism
196
underscores this relational dimension.
Amazon even explicitly states above
197
its complaint form “Thank you for reporting a community rules violation.”
Reputation-based sanctions also enable more collaborative relations in
consumer markets just as they do in other commercial contexts—including
198
among diamond merchants, cotton traders, and lobster trappers.
Feedback
left on websites or tweets are a form of expression to other community
members about the transgression of a shared norm.
Thus, consumers and corporations resolve disputes mostly in relation to
norms, rather than laws. The private consumer legal system has the potential to
buttresses collaborative relations that antagonistic public court processes sever.
While this discussion should not be taken to argue that a privatized system is

191.
See supra Sections I.A. and I.B.
192.
See Sijun Wang et al., Employees’ Decision Making in the Face of Customers’
Fuzzy Return Requests, 76 J. MARKETING 69, 80 (2012).
193.
See supra Section I.B.2.
194.
See Stone, supra note 35, at 112-13.
195.
See, e.g., Rule, supra note 19, at 772 (discussing eBay’s internal study that
concluded consumers used eBay more after dispute resolution). Because these conclusions rely on
companies’ internal studies they may reflect biased results.
196.
See AMAZON, supra note 126 (“Any seller that fails to cooperate in good faith to
resolve a buyer’s complaint may have its account privileges restricted or terminated.”). Cf. Bernstein,
Cotton Industry, supra note 21, at 1737-38 (discussing how a cotton merchant’s failure to abide by trade
association extralegal enforcement mechanisms would result in expulsion from the industry’s primary
trade association); Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems ApproachPotential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175, 178 (1998) (arguing for dispute
resolution adapted to the customs, norms, and rules of online communities).
197.
See Contact Us, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/reports/contact-us.
198.
See supra Section I.D.; JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE
(1988).
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199

normatively superior, the private dispute system does not obviously fail to
advance society’s non-monetary interests any more than the public court
200
system does. Each at its best has a claim on legitimacy. Paradoxically, profitmotivated corporations often design dispute processes that enshrine community
values.
B. The Pitfalls of the Corporation as Courthouse
1. Lack of Transparency
201

Scholars have often criticized the lack of transparency in arbitration.
Even though legal cases rarely go to trial, when they do they become public
202
203
record. Arbitral decisions usually do not. However, even arbitration is
204
considerably more transparent than corporations’ internal dispute processes.
205
As a start, arbitrators commonly post their basic procedures online.
Arbitrators also apply the law to the facts presented at trial, and do not consider
206
extrinsic factors such as the consumer’s profitability to the company.
In
contrast, the consumer corporation’s procedures and criteria for making a
decision are kept confidential. They may consider factors well beyond the law,
without the consumer knowing.

199.
Indeed, scholars have argued the larger move away from trials erodes important
clarification of legal norms. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619, 2622–23 (1995).
200.
From a normative perspective, Lawrence Solum has argued that “a core right of
participation is essential for the legitimacy of adjudication.” Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 274 (2004). As discussed above, the nature of participation in the corporation as
courthouse is different from, but not immediately inferior to, that in public courts. See supra Section
II.A.1.
201.
See, e.g., Glover, supra note 27, at 3052 (“[p]rivate parties can exercise [] quasilawmaking power almost entirely outside of public view, through rarely read and little-understood
provisions in contracts of adhesion subject to scant public scrutiny or regulatory oversight.”).
202.
Most consumer cases entering the public courthouse are settled and thus may not
become public record. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers 2-3,
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_factsheet_arbitration-study.pdf (finding that of 3,462
individual lawsuits only two went to trial). Settlements create their own challenges in terms of
transparency and ongoing judicial involvement. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 26, at 1082; Minna J. Kotkin,
Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2006) (concluding that invisible
settlements make discrimination in the workplace itself invisible).
203.
However, several states require arbitrators to release case data publicly. See
Resnik, supra note 2, at 2897.
204.
Scholars have highlighted transparency concerns in the context of the mass
settlement of torts. See Engstrom, supra note 11.
205.
See, e.g., Consumer Arbitration Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer (Jan. 1, 2016).
206.
See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 134, at 1091 (empirically concluding there is
little evidence that “arbitrators and judges engage in qualitatively different kinds of decision-making or
opinion-writing.”).
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2. Procedural Inequality and Discrimination
Corporations’ highly tailored dispute processes violate a fundamental
207
principle of the legal system: like cases should be treated alike. Among other
reasons why procedural inconsistency might be problematic, it raises
distributional concerns.
Studies have for decades found that wealthier and better-educated
consumers are more likely to complain to corporations and are more successful
208
when they do than are low-income consumers. However, the same is true in
209
the judicial system.
A key difference is that public courts and arbitral
tribunals are designed for procedural equality, while corporations’ internal
processes are designed to discriminate.
Companies create unequal procedures for like cases based on factors such
as how much the consumer can spend and the worth of the consumer’s personal
210
ties.
This means that corporations might deliberately treat two consumers
with equal wealth and the same exact dispute differently based on the family or
neighborhood in which the consumers were raised. This adds another layer of
economic inequality onto those already present in courts, arbitration, and the
211
traditional customer service department.
These dynamics intersect in complicated ways with racial discrimination.
Corporations’ push toward automated dispute resolution offers greater
212
decision-making uniformity.
Automation offers promise to improve
distributional outcomes by removing errors and bias introduced by frontline
human decision makers. This could increase access to justice for some groups,
such as blacks, who are less likely to enter the civil justice system because they
believe—as empirical studies indicate—that they are subjected to judicial

207.
William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1868 (2002) (“Our procedural systems rest upon the idea that adversarial
litigants in a single case should be accorded equivalent procedural opportunities and upon the
proposition that like cases should be processed according to like procedural rules.”).
208.
See Nader, supra note 13; Merzer, supra note 64, at 3 (finding wealthier and
more educated consumers are more likely to ask for a refund, and wealthier consumers are more likely
to have their request granted). Cf. Daniela Caruso, The Baby and the Bath Water: The American
Critique of European Contract Law, 61 AM. J. CORP. L. 479, 498-99 (discussing the private law
resistance to considering distributional concerns).
209.
See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 26, at 1076 (critiquing disparate outcomes that result
from unequal resources among litigants in private settlement processes); Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974);
Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and The Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1413, 1459 (2011) (concluding that private enforcement mechanisms in special education
promote inequality).
210.
See supra Section I.B.4.
211.
Some commentators have argued arbitration also leads to inconsistency, though
that inconsistency is not purposeful. See Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, The Lawlessness of
Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355 (2003) (arguing the lack of precedent in arbitration leads to
inconsistent rulings). But see Weidemaier, supra note 134 (concluding arbitrators use precedent).
212.
U.S. Patent No. 7797212, supra note 62 (“[l]eaving fee refund decisions up to
individual employees often creates inconsistency in the overall refund policy of a business.”)
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213

bias. By relying on computer algorithms, the corporation may thus avoid
some forms of racial discrimination ingrained in minds.
However, if those algorithms provide less redress to consumers with
smaller savings and lower-income social networks, upward mobility is more
difficult for all. To the extent these algorithms are viewed more as a component
of price discrimination, with those paying higher prices receiving better service,
this differential treatment is more familiar than the analogy to courts would
imply. However, the resulting private dispute system risks exacerbating socioeconomic inequality in subtle ways, and thus at the very least is worth
recognizing as a potential pitfall of the system. Also, because historically
disadvantaged minorities are more likely to be low-income, the corporations’
dispute processes may also overall contribute to racial economic inequality.
3. Inadequate Aggregation Mechanisms
The small amount in controversy may not justify the time required for a
consumer to complain about or arbitrate a lawful claim. Consumer corporations
sometimes offer their own internal aggregation mechanisms in response to
recognized mass harms, and private sector third parties offer some promise for
aggregation, but these mechanisms are inadequate. This means that even when
faced with readily available individual complaint processes, large numbers of
consumers would never obtain redress in the private legal system without the
214
existing public backdrop.
Private actors have created aggregation mechanisms both inside and
outside the consumer corporation. Private dispute resolution firms that receive
many complaints drive the aggregation mechanisms lying outside the
corporation. They then either reach out to consumer companies to obtain
redress, in a form of collective or automated bargaining, or file a large number
215
of arbitration claims. One startup exemplifying the potential future of private
sector aggregation, David, asks consumers to provide account information and
a description of the problem. It then brings typically small-value disputes to
large telecommunications companies (presumably, Goliaths) such as Comcast,

213.
See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks & Haekyung Jeon-Slaughter, Race, Income, and
Perceptions of the U.S. Court System, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 249, 249 (2001) (finding higher-income
blacks are more skeptical they will be treated equally in the courts, especially in civil cases); Sara
Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice (working paper) (concluding blacks’
expectations of bias in the civil legal system can prevent them from seeking justice); Jerry Kang et al.,
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1124, 1131 (2012) (summarizing evidence of
systematic racial bias in the court system). Cf. Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors: Bankruptcy
Disparities by Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231, 231 (2009) (finding that blacks obtain worse results in
bankruptcy courts and are subject to more motions to dismiss).
214.
For a discussion of public mechanisms for aggregate redress, see infra Section
III.A.2.
215.
See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 3, at 394 (sharing evidence of plaintiffside firms filing ghost class actions in arbitration tribunals).
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216

AT&T, Verizon, and Time Warner. The company collects a small fee—
217
thirty percent—only if the dispute is resolved.
Another aggregation mechanism outside the firm comes from consumers
218
organizing through social media.
Consumers have, for example, set up
Facebook sites to share information as to how to proceed in arbitration or how
219
to navigate a company’s customer service process. This avenue is becoming
more possible with increasingly automated online dispute processes within
corporations.
Like class actions, these external aggregation mechanisms require little
220
time to participate. However, they cannot amass plaintiffs who do not opt in.
It is also unclear whether these mechanisms could provide redress at scale even
if they could involve most consumers—the corporation could simply refuse to
cooperate. Thus, in their current forms, from a design perspective, external
221
aggregate mechanisms are less powerful than class actions at their best.
Internally coordinated claim aggregation occurs when the company
222
organizes its own mass payout structure. It may do this after recognizing that
it has delivered problematic products, or after consumers take to social media
and complaint venues with sufficient force. But one of the main incentives for
223
such a program may be the threat of regulatory enforcement or class actions.
Under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a class action to be “superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” many
courts have rejected class action suits when the corporation has already set up
224
its internal payout system.
There is so far little evidence that internal
aggregation is viable independent of public mechanisms.

216.
See DAVID, www.senddavid.com. A related model can be found at Measured
Up, which brings consumer complaints to large “partner” companies including Verizon, Walmart, and
American Express with the goal of resolving disputes. See http://www.measuredup.com.
217.
See DAVID, id.
218.
See generally Jeremy R. McClane, Class Action in the Age of Twitter: A Dispute
Systems Approach, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213, 245-46 (2014) (discussing how social media
provides consumers with an alternative to class actions).
219.
See id.
220.
See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 3, at 94-95 (“[U]nlike traditional class
action attorneys, who frequently represent thousands of plaintiffs, arbitration entrepreneurs string
together a few dozen consumers at most.”).
221.
Granted, courts have similar challenges certifying classes because of the
difficulty of knowing the identities and similarity of stories for what are usually large groups of
consumers. See, e.g., Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose” Implications of the History of
the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 767 (2006) (describing the
question of whether to certify a class action as “a troubling problem for both courts and commentators”).
222.
See Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms: Mass-Claims Resolution
Without Class Actions, 63 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1255 (2014).
223.
See Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 11.
224.
See Eric P. Voight, A Company’s Voluntary Refund Program for Consumers
Can Be a Fair and Efficient Alternative to a Class Action, 31 REV. LITIG. 617, 620-21 (2012)
(mentioning nine district courts that have denied class action relief due to corporations’ self-initiated
refund policies).
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4. Susceptibility to Market Failures
A dispute system designed and governed largely by market forces rises
and falls with the level of competition in the underlying market. In particular,
breakdowns related to three areas may pose challenges to the private consumer
legal system: market concentration, behavioral economics, and information
asymmetries.
Although even monopolists have financial incentives to provide customer
service, the literature suggests that companies invest less in dispute resolution
225
in less concentrated markets. The “Ma Bell” telephone monopoly that lasted
until 1984 provides a well-documented historic example of this relationship,
226
marked as it was by low customer service. Today, three out of every four
homes have only one option for high-speed Internet services, and consumers in
227
many parts of the country have few choices for cable. A Senate Commerce
Committee investigation found that the absence of competition in the cable
228
industry led to “abominable” customer service.
The leading providers of
cable and Internet, Comcast and Time Warner, have the lowest customer
229
satisfaction among companies in America.
In concentrated markets,
companies may worry less about their reputation or losing consumers following
poor dispute resolution because consumers have few (if any) other choices.
Another category of market failure relates to consumer behavioral biases
and sophistication deficits. Consumers are rarely represented by counsel during
small-value dispute processes. Corporations’ customer service settlement
procedures, on the other hand, are designed by sophisticated lawyers and
business analysts. The corporation may thereby be able to exploit consumers’
cognitive biases, perhaps through a process perceived as fair, to leave them
225.
See, e.g., Hansen et al., supra note 50, at 9, 12 (“[i]nvestment in complaint
management is most effective in competitive markets. . . .”); Claes Fornell & Birger Wernerfelt, A
Model for Customer Complaint Management, 7 MARKETING SCI. 287, 296 (1988) (finding that
“complaint management is more effective the greater the number of competitors. . . .”).
226.
See, e.g., Robert D. Atkinson, The Role of Competition in a National Broadband
Policy, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 10 (2009) (mentioning the poor customer service associated
with the “Ma Bell” monopoly).
227.
See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PREPARED REMARKS OF FCC
CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER: “THE FACTS AND FUTURE OF BROADBAND COMPETITION” 4 (Sept. 4,
2014),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329161A1.pdf;
Eduardo
Porter,
Concentrated Markets Take Big Toll on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2014, at B1 (discussing the
concentrated nature of the cable industry).
228.
See Michael D. Blanchard, Regulated Industries—Statutory Construction of
Section 541(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: A
Presumption in Favor of Practical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 447 (1996).
229.
See Polly Mosendz, Comcast and Time Warner Are the Most Hated Companies
in America, THE WIRE, (May 20, 2014) http://www.thewire.com/technology/2014/05/comcast-and-time
-warner-are-the-most-hated-companies-in-america/371295/; Press Release, Leichtman Research Group,
Major Pay-TV Providers Added About 10,000 Subscribers in 1Q 2015 (2015),
http://www.leichtmanresearch.com/press/051415release.html (listing Comcast and Time Warner as the
leading cable companies by market share); Sig Ueland, 20 Top Internet Service Providers,
PRACTICALECOMMERCE, (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/3225-20-Top
-Internet-Service-Providers (listing Comcast as the top provider of Internet and Time Warner as third).
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satisfied with an outcome that gives them less than that which the law, or
negotiations in good faith, would provide. This is particularly concerning given
consumer corporations’ growing sophistication in incorporating behavioral
230
economics into their business strategy.
Finally, there is the possibility of informational market failures.
Information intermediaries such as reputation-based websites aim to address
these shortcomings. However, like diamond traders, consumers and companies
231
have opportunistically sought to influence reputational mechanisms.
Between 2010 and 2013, the percent of companies with social media programs
232
increased from twelve percent to fifty-nine percent. Though these programs
are mostly ethical, they can sometimes take an unethical turn. Employees have
been caught posting positive reviews of their employers’ products without
233
disclosing their employment status. And some companies hire “fake review
234
mills” to leave favorable comments.
In response, corporations have developed mechanisms for policing
reputation institutions. Websites such as Yelp develop software to monitor
235
suspicious activity, such as repeat reviews from the same computer.
Amazon.com mines the personal data of reviewers and removes the review if
236
they know the author. In one case, the retailer repeatedly removed one son’s
five-star reviews of his mother’s book, and warns that it will “vigorously
prosecute any attempted manipulation of reviews by suspending or terminating
accounts, withholding remittances, and pursuing civil and criminal
237
penalties.” eBay implemented a feedback appeals process for certain types of
sales, such as automobile transactions, that were particularly ripe for buyer

230.
See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big
Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2015).
231.
See Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 21, at 157 (concluding that
diamond industry transactors manipulate the role of reputation institutions because of their influence).
232.
ABERDEEN GROUP, SOCIAL CUSTOMER CARE: SECRETS TO BUILD A WINNING
STRATEGY (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.aberdeen.com/research/8578/ra-social-customer
-service/content.aspx (“[a]doption of social customer care programs increased by approximately fivefold between 2010 and 2013 (12% in 2010 vs. 59% in 2013).”).
233.
See Mary Pilon, A Fake Amazon Reviewer Confesses, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 9,
2009),
http://blogs.wsj.com/wallet/2009/07/09/delonghis-strange-brew-tracking-down-fake-amazon
-raves (mentioning employees posting positive reviews of their employers’ products).
234.
See David Streitfeld, In a Race to Out-Rave, 5-Star Web Reviews Go for $5,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011 (reporting on social brand management companies, also known as fake
review mills, that offer services such as writing customer reviews).
235.
See generally Kaitlin A. Dohse, Fabricating Feedback: Blurring the Line
Between Brand Management and Bogus Reviews, 13 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 363, 363 (2013).
236.
See Chris Morran, Amazon Is Data Mining Reviewers’ Personal Relationships,
CONSUMERIST, July 6, 2015, at https://consumerist.com/2015/07/06/amazon-is-data-mining-reviewers
-personal-relationships.
237.
See Anti-Manipulation
Policy for Customer Reviews, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help_search_1
-1?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201749630&qid=1431546060&sr=1-1; Dohse, supra note 235, at 377 (describing
how an author’s son had the five-star review of his mother’s book repeatedly removed).
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238

exploitation of sellers. However, as the example of the hotel that tried to fine
a guest $500 for leaving a negative online review illustrates, the websites
239
themselves may not be able to do anything against some strategies.
It is
questionable whether the private sector alone can succeed in preventing
misinformation on its websites without public support.
Finally, there is a collective action problem with network governance.
240
Only about four percent of unhappy consumers complain.
If this number is
too small to matter to companies or to ratings, reputation-based sanctions will
241
not work. Furthermore, information asymmetries may arise when consumers
242
do not consult ratings, as in the case of software.
The risk is that these market failures undermine all of the potential
advantages of private ordering. Rather than offering low-cost access to redress,
consumers are made to pay in subtle ways, such as by spending excessive time
complaining or by having deserved redress denied. Reputation-based sanctions
no longer hold consumers accountable because information available is
inaccurate. The perception of procedural justice is used to mask what is, in fact,
an absence of meaningful participation. In short, when markets fail, the risk is
that the private consumer legal system fails with it.
III. The Public Backdrop for the Private Consumer Legal System
The above discussion raises the question of what procedural public
interventions are needed. This Part assesses the existing public backdrop and
concludes that it is unlikely to address many of the corporate courthouse’s main
pitfalls. However, the current emphasis on regulation over courts, and direct
oversight of the most problematic industries, is sensible from a dispute systems
design perspective.
A. The Current Regulatory Architecture
Although consumer dispute resolution largely unfolds without reference to
the law or courts, public institutions still overall play a meaningful role.
Agencies are the most significant public actor. Secondarily, private lawsuits
offer some redress mostly through class actions, as individual suits even in
238.
See, e.g., Colin Rule & Harpreet Singh, ODR and Online Reputation Systems:
Maintaining Trust and Accuracy Through Effective Redress, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 163 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al. eds., 2013) (describing buyer exploitation of used
car sellers by threatening to leave negative reviews).
239.
See supra note 174.
240.
See Jerry Plymire, Complaints as Opportunities, 5 J. SERVS. MARKETING 61
(1991).
241.
Those four percent could comprise most of the reviewing population, in which
case companies will care more than that small number suggests, assuming it is impossible for companies
to distinguish that four percent. See infra Part IV.A.
242.
See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 152, at 184 (finding consumers rarely consult
ratings for software purchases).
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small claims cases amount to a small fraction of consumer contractual disputes
243
handled by companies.
1. Direct Agency Oversight
A patchwork of state and federal legislation provides for direct agency
involvement in corporate dispute processes in many industries. Legislatures
have focused this oversight on industries with high concentration or cause for
concern about behavioral economics-related practices—such as airline, cable,
244
and finance. This indicates the potential for the legislative process, relying
on agencies, to respond when markets fail to produce sufficient dispute
resolution.
Federal legislation tasks airlines with maintaining certain minimum
customer service standards, including “ensuring responsiveness to consumer
problems” and “handling ‘bumped’ passengers with fairness and consistency in
245
the case of over-sales.”
The statute relies on a self-monitoring approach, in
which the airlines keep customer service records available for audit by the
246
Department of Transportation (DOT). For example, the DOT recently fined
Delta $375,000 when a review of internal complaint data revealed that the
airline had regularly bumped passengers without first seeking volunteers and
247
without offering compensation.
Federal laws also require financial institutions to resolve disputes
promptly, maintain accurate complaint records, and have systems to correct any
248
legal violations causing complaints. Bank examiners from the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) regularly collect data about the complaint
process at a very abstracted level, such as the time for dispute resolution, to
249
ensure that banks are complying with these specific laws.
In the case of the cable industry, Congress required the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to “establish standards by which cable
250
operators may fulfill their customer service requirements.”
The FCC

243.
See Arbitration Study, supra note 157, at §1 p. 15, §7 pp. 10-12 (finding only
870 cases filed by consumers against credit card issuers in districts representing approximately one-fifth
of the United States). Most arbitration provisions contain small claims carve-outs. See id. at 1.4.6.
244.
See Porter, supra note 227 (describing concentration in airline and cable
industries).
245.
14 C.F.R. § 259.5(b) (2011).
246.
See id. § 259.5(c).
247.
See Delta Fined for Treatment of Passengers It Had Bumped, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/business/delta-air-lines-fined-for-mishandling-bumped
-passengers.html.
248.
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
MANUAL 12 (Oct. 2012); Telephone Interview with M.L. (June 8, 2015).
249.
See Telephone Interview with M.L. (June 8, 2015).
250.
47 U.S.C. § 552(b). The enumerated requirements include standards governing
“refunds” and “telephone availability.” See id.
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responded by issuing detailed standards such as requiring the cable company to
251
issue refunds within 30 days or in the next billing cycle.
The health insurance sector in some regards has the most far-reaching
oversight. The Affordable Care Act ensures not only an internal process by
which patients can appeal insurer plan decisions, but also establishes an
external body to which the patient can appeal final internal decisions. This
external process is run by a private contractor and overseen by the Department
252
of Health and Human Services.
Overall, most agencies have taken a minimum standards approach to their
delegated authority to oversee customer service. This floor for customer service
typically covers concrete issues such as the time taken to resolve disputes.
However, they do not speak to the process by which disputes are resolved.
Furthermore, many industries have no such federal standards for customer
253
service, and states have filled the gaps only in very limited contexts.
2. Filling the Aggregation Gap: Agencies and Class Actions
The importance of providing aggregate redress has often led reformers to
conclude that without class actions companies will not be held accountable for
small harms. However, these analyses typically focus on the dichotomy
between courts and arbitration, while leaving out a more important mechanism
254
for aggregate redress: the administrative agency.
Courts play an increasingly limited role in aggregating small-value
contractual disputes between consumers and companies due to the rise of
mandatory arbitration. Nonetheless, they still do provide relief. For example, a
recent CFPB study found consumers obtained $370 million annually through
all federal class actions for major consumer financial products such as credit
255
cards, bank accounts, and mortgages.

251.
See Customer Service Standards, FED. COMM. COMM’N (April 2, 2012),
https://www.fcc.gov/media/customer-service-standards. The agency did not provide any standards
related to the process by which refunds are decided.
252.
See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, HHSADMINISTERED FEDERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Consumer-Support-and-Information/csg-ext
-appeals-facts.html. Congress has also mandated internal claims procedures for ERISA disputes. See 29
C.F.R. §§ 2560.503-1 (1999).
253.
For example, California and New York mandate that issuers of pre-paid calling
cards offer complaint-handling services. See Mark E. Budnitz et al., Deceptive Claims for Prepaid
Telephone Cards and the Need for Regulation, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 25 (2006).
254.
See, e.g., CFPB, supra note 202 (analyzing aggregate redress without
considering how much relief is provided by agencies); See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU,
CFPB STUDY FINDS THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS LIMIT RELIEF FOR CONSUMERS (March 10,
2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-limit
-relief-for-consumers (concluding based on study of class actions that mandatory arbitration is
problematic).
255.
See CFPB, supra note 202, at 2-3 (listing total arbitration awards during the
three-year period as $400,000, and for class actions as $1.1 billion).
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Because over the same period consumers received $133,000 annually in
arbitration awards, or less than one-tenth the amount from class actions, the
256
CFPB concluded that mandatory arbitration clauses limit consumer relief.
This conclusion—a version of which is common in the legal literature—
257
overlooks the role of consumer agencies in providing aggregate redress.
Indeed, the CFPB’s enforcement lawyers alone have brought about $2.5 billion
annually in monetary relief to consumers, or more than six times the amount
258
from class actions. Other agencies and state attorneys general also obtain
259
billions in awards for consumers annually in the financial sector.
Consequently, in industries with active regulatory agencies, strong deterrence
can be obtained without class actions. As one former mid-level manager of a
multi-billion dollar company put it, “A class action for $10 million dollars is no
big deal—we could pay them off without batting an eye. But the risk of
260
regulators coming down on us makes people nervous.”
Thus, the current public backdrop provides large amounts of aggregate
redress and strong deterrence mostly through regulation, and secondarily (and
261
decreasingly)
through class actions. Moreover, at least in the consumer
context, reliance on regulation rather than class actions is theoretically
preferable from a systems design perspective. Although regulation has
262
substantial limitations,
it is overall preferable because it can advance
society’s interests in aggregate dispute resolution at lower cost and greater
effectiveness.
In terms of costs, with litigation, both consumers and corporations spend
considerable resources on lawyers’ fees. By way of illustration, the CFPB in its
study found that about eighteen percent of settlement awards went to

256.
See CFPB STUDY FINDS THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS LIMIT RELIEF FOR
CONSUMERS, supra note 254.
257.
See, e.g., CFPB, supra note 202 (studying the question of whether class actions
are needed without considering the role of agencies in providing aggregate relief); Fitzpatrick, supra
note 7, at 161 (concluding class actions are needed without considering agency relief). Nowhere in the
CFPB’s report is there any consideration of the aggregate relief provided by agencies.
258.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, ENFORCING CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201507_cfpb_enforcing-consumer
-protection-laws.pdf (reporting CFPB enforcement actions obtained $10 billion in relief between 2011
and 2015).
259.
See, e.g., Christina Rexrode & Andrew Grossman, BofA Accord Ends a Long
Legal Drama, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2014, at C.1 (discussing a Department of Justice settlement
requiring Bank of America to pay seven billion dollars to consumers). Cf. Margaret H. Lemos,
Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV.
486, 499-500 (2012) (describing the similar role of state attorney general aggregate litigation and private
class actions).
260.
Telephone Interview with L.B. (Aug. 5, 2015). Of course, a regime could be
constructed in which class actions caused more fear than regulation.
261.
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 7, at 161 (“I still see every reason to believe
that businesses will eventually be able to eliminate virtually all class actions that are brought against
them. . . .”).
262.
See infra Section III.B.
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263

attorneys. By contrast, the CFPB enforcement group’s salaries amount to
264
roughly two percent of the awards it obtains for consumers. Also, plaintiffside lawyers have financial self-interest in bringing bad faith claims against
265
deep-pocketed companies. Granted, reputational interests and institutional
266
financial incentives may also cause regulators to over-reach.
However,
research suggests that regulatory employees’ financial self-interests lead to
under-enforcement in some industries, which may help secure lucrative
267
business jobs later. Thus, resolving disputes through regulation rather than
class actions reduces costs from frivolous lawsuits. While lower costs are
beneficial for many reasons, corporations likely pass on some of these savings
268
to consumers in the form of lower prices.
Regulation as an aggregate mechanism also advances other societal
interests such as truth, justice and community norms. Courts are institutionally
ill-equipped for the economic analyses involved in transactional consumer
269
disputes. Instead, they rely on heuristics such as inferring compliance from
270
the defendant’s institutional structure. Regulators, by contrast, have deep
271
economic expertise and familiarity with consumer markets. Decisions by a
more competent regulatory decision maker advance society’s interest in
accuracy and in avoiding injustices such as haphazard class action awards.
At its best, the administrative agency can also promote procedural justice,
autonomy, and collaborative relations. The ideal for regulators is for companies
263.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 153 at 17.
264.
The CFPB has obtained $2.5 billion annually in relief for consumers from
enforcement actions. See supra note 258. CFPB enforcement attorneys cost taxpayers about $45 million
annually, if it is assumed that they use a proportional amount of agency resources. See CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
PROGRAM
SUMMARY
BY
BUDGET
ACTIVITY
(2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/budget-in-brief.pdf (reporting a projected CFPB budget of
$448 million); Email from AV (Aug. 10, 2015) (stating enforcement makes up ten percent of the
agency’s employees). The two percent figure is calculated as (448*.1)/2,500=.02.
265.
See, e.g., Bone & Evans, supra note 161, at 1314 (estimating thirty percent of
class action filings are frivolous); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (criticizing plaintiff attorneys for advancing
their own interests over those of class members). Bad-faith suits are not specific to class actions. See
Joanna C. Schwartz, The Cost of Suing Business, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
266.
See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127
HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (2014) (arguing reputational and institutional monetary incentives may drive
regulators to seek excessive monetary awards).
267.
See, e.g., Severin Borenstein et al., Career Concerns, Inaction and Market
Inefficiency: Evidence from Utility Regulation, 60 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 220 (2012) (concluding the data
are consistent with career prospects discouraging regulators from warranted regulatory actions).
268.
See supra note 164.
269.
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 74 (2008) (arguing courts lack the institutional competence to monitor fast-changing consumer
markets).
270.
See Lauren Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to
Institutionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 888 (2011) (describing courts’ tendency
to defer to institutional structure to infer nondiscrimination).
271.
The FTC, for example, has a Bureau of Economics with seventy Ph.D.-level
economists. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC And New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 353
(2008).
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272

to self-regulate, although this goal is often overlooked. Self-regulation means
that the corporation analyzes the legality of its own actions and arranges
aggregate payouts to consumers when it identifies violations, rather than
273
requiring public courts or agencies to compel such action. To this end,
regulators often develop ongoing relationships with regulated companies. Such
274
close ties are concerning because of the potential for capture.
But they also
likely enable dispute resolution that is less alienating than adversarial court
proceedings. Ongoing relations enable regulators to correct and prevent
harmful practices outside the formal legal process—without ever bringing an
275
enforcement action. They simply tell the company that it needs to fix the
practice and compensate consumers, potentially allowing the corporation to
276
manage its own aggregate payout plan.
If designed well, this approach can
promote autonomy and procedural justice for the corporation and its
employees.
Moreover, when regulators encourage corporations to provide refunds, the
result would presumably be to strengthen the relationship between the
corporation and consumer. Whereas class actions are alienating and enable
plaintiff-side lawyers to control much of the communications with the
consumers, with regulatory intervention the corporation often administers the
277
payouts and serves as the sole source of contact with the consumer. The
corporation’s continued ownership of the refund relationship can build trust and
relations between consumers and corporations. Cooperative regulation thus
offers the promise to strengthen the type of collaborative relations and
solidarity that some scholars have argued are at the heart of contract law, and of
278
the economy.

272.
See, e.g., Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination as a Method of
Consumer Protection, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 807, 808 (2015) (highlighting the goal of self-regulation in the
CFPB); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 413 (2011) (arguing that “[o]ne key and currently overlooked
potential mechanism for controlling and minimizing systemic financial risk is industry-wide selfregulation.”).
273.
This concept is related to but distinct from self-regulatory organizations (SROs),
which are third-party private entities that sometimes serve to regulate industries. See, e.g., Stavros
Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets As Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (2007)
(surveying SROs in securities regulation).
274.
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16-18 (2010).
275.
See Van Loo, supra note 230 (discussing consumer agencies’ ability to collect
information outside the legal process more efficiently).
276.
See, e.g., Remus & Zimmerman, supra note 11, at 133.
277.
See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, Justice for the Masses? Aggregate Litigation & Its
Alternatives, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 81 (“grumbling on websites devoted to specific mass
litigations suggest [plaintiffs in mass torts] are often unhappy and distrustful of their own lawyers, the
defendants, and the courts.”).
278.
See supra Section II.A.4 (discussing Markovits’s theory of contract law and
relations between corporations and consumers).
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Of course, the choice between regulation and class actions as aggregate
279
mechanisms is not binary—the two could play a complementary role. Courts
also provide advantages that regulators do not, such as a resistance to capture
280
and a potentially more powerful symbolic effect. The broader point here is
one that is often omitted from discussions on procedural privatization: even
under a mandatory arbitration regime, consumers currently have access to
aggregate redress through the consumer agency. Furthermore, if regulation is
functioning effectively, reliance on regulation rather than class actions may
lower enforcement costs and overall be better for consumers.
3. Regulators and Complaints
281

Like rural residents whose land has been trespassed by cattle, after
direct negotiations fail consumers sometimes contact public officials directly.
Agencies receive hundreds of thousands of complaints from consumers each
282
year.
Regulatory complaint processing serves two main functions with
respect to the corporation as courthouse: to provide an alternative remedy and
to influence how corporations handle complaints.
One purpose of regulatory consumer complaint mechanisms may be to
283
offer a “remedial tool to make up for shortcomings in the courts.” Given that
the corporation is the de facto courthouse for most consumer contractual
disputes, regulatory complaint processing also can make up for shortcomings in
284
corporations’ internal dispute processes.
For example, the CFPB takes a
proactive role by forwarding complaints to companies and following up to see
285
how those complaints were resolved. A recent analysis found that following
the launch of the CFPB’s complaint department, consumers gradually disputed
financial companies’ responses less, which is consistent with consumers
286
viewing those responses as more satisfactory. Anecdotally, consumers have
279.
One potential justification for class actions is that they spur regulators to act.
Increased regulation can result from litigation. See Fleming, supra note 80 (chronicling how Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. led to consumer protection legal reform). However, greater market
monitoring may be obtainable at lower costs simply by regulators hiring more examiners, or monitoring
more consumer complaints. See infra Part IV.B.
280.
See infra Section III.B (considering the implications of capture).
281.
See Ellickson, supra note 21, at 679 (describing how ranchette owners
sometimes respond to an incident by contacting a public official such as a county supervisor or animal
control officer). They may take this step either because direct negotiation proves inadequate, or out of a
belief that it will get better results. See id.
282.
See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 88, at fig.4 (analyzing over three hundred thousand
complaints in the CFPB database over a recent two-year period).
283.
See Porter, supra note 49, at 77.
284.
Cf. Littwin, supra note 88, (analyzing the CFPB’s complaint process as “a forum
for resolving consumer issues that might not otherwise be addressed.”).
285.
See Porter, supra note 49, at 67 (describing how complaints are flagged for
investigation if the financial institution does not close the complaint in a timely manner); Ayres et al.,
supra note 83, at 368-69 (finding significant variations in banks’ speed of processing complaints).
286.
See Littwin, supra note 88, at 922, fig.1. The study did not allow for causality to
be determined.
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287

noted faster responses when the CFPB forwards complaints. Furthermore,
many banks process complaints from the CFPB in an executive customer
288
service group that provides more attentive complaint handling. Regulatory
complaints may thus trigger an alternative path to redress within financial
289
institutions, providing relief to tens of thousands of consumers each year.
Regulatory complaints are another overlooked appeal mechanism outside the
courts.
The second main procedural function of regulatory complaints is to more
generally influence corporations’ complaint processes even for consumers who
290
do not complain.
Using advanced software—such as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC)’s Consumer Sentinel—agencies analyze these complaints
to identify trends and highlight areas for further investigation and possibly
291
regulatory action.
For example, unlike the FTC, the CFPB posts complaint
292
data online. Approximately eighty-five percent of complaints submitted to
293
the CFPB are first submitted directly to the company but left unresolved.
Consequently, financial institutions improve their complaint handling to make
unwanted regulatory and public attention less likely. For example, after the
CFPB public database initially revealed large discrepancies among banks, some
institutions revamped their customer service departments and tied executive
compensation to the bank’s performance in that database relative to their
294
peers.
287.
See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE
ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_consumer-response-annual
-report-2014.pdf (quoting a consumer noting faster resolution for complaints forwarded by the agency).
288.
See Wieczner, supra note 115.
289.
See Littwin, supra note 88, at 904, 913 (describing the consumer regulatory
complaint process as providing access to justice and finding that about one in five of 174,095 complaints
forwarded by the CFPB in a recent two-year period resulted in relief). It is unknown how many of these
would have obtained relief otherwise, but eighty-five percent of those in the database had previously
asked for relief directly to the company, and the average consumer had asked three times. See Interview
with S.N. (May 28, 2015). Taking eighty-five percent of one in five consumers out of the 174,095 would
amount to about thirty thousand consumers.
290.
Ayres et al., supra note 83, at 369 (concluding that companies should heed the
early results of the CFPB’s complaints database and “[s]trive to improve their response processes for all
consumers.”)
291.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, AT&T to Pay $80 Million to FTC for Consumer
Refunds in Mobile Cramming Case (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press
-releases/2014/10/att-pay-80-million-ftc-consumer-refunds-mobile-cramming-case
(describing
Consumer Sentinel as “a secure, online database available to more than 2,000 civil and criminal law
enforcement agencies in the U.S. and abroad.”); CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB
SUPERVISION
AND
EXAMINATION
MANUAL,
at
Overview
7
(2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual-v2.pdf
(describing
how a high volume of complaints may result in a targeted examination); Littwin, supra note 88,
at 925 (concluding the CFPB uses complaint data for regulation).
292.
See Littwin, supra note 88, at 895.
293.
Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015); Littwin, supra note 88, at 922
(noting the average consumer went to the company three times before submitting a CFPB complaint).
294.
See CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 287 (“Many companies
are adapting to [the CFPB’s focus on complaints] to become more directly responsive to consumer
concerns.”); Ayres et al., supra note 83 (finding discrepancies among banks in the public database);
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Regulatory complaints offer several other benefits from a systems
perspective. They make it more likely that regulators will identify market
failures related to concentrated industries, since such market failures—more
than for those related to behavioral economics and information asymmetries—
would be expected to still generate complaints. By posting complaints online,
regulators also offer an information intermediary that may be difficult to co-opt
with misinformation. Finally, regulatory complaints give consumers a voice in
the regulatory process. By providing another avenue for consumers to feel
heard, regulators may contribute to the consumer legal system’s legitimacy and
make consumers more likely to engage in value-maximizing economic
295
transactions.
B. Limitations of the Current Regulatory Architecture
The public backdrop for the private consumer legal system has three main
categories of limitations. First, its main actor, the consumer regulator, lacks the
information it needs to address certain pitfalls of the corporation as courthouse.
Second, it is unclear whether the system is adequately preserving reputation
intermediaries. Third, because the public backdrop relies so heavily on
regulation, it is vulnerable to the limitations inherent in that institution, such as
capture.
Agencies are inadequately informed above all because they rely mostly on
regulatory complaints or vague aggregate company reports for information
296
about how corporations make dispute resolution decisions. Regulators do not
collect information from corporations to analyze their decision-making criteria.
Instead, regulators mostly only check that the company is complying with the
297
specific requirements of the law, which have remained static for years. This
means that problematic dispute resolution practices about which consumers are
unaware—such as the use of familial wealth—would go undetected by
regulators unless they became public knowledge. Furthermore, agencies pay
almost no attention to functions outside the customer service department, such
as the corporation’s role in handling hundreds of millions of disputes in
298
network trials.

Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015) (stating that companies have arranged compensation to
reflect performance in the CFPB’s public complaint database).
295.
Cf. TYLER, supra note 17 (finding empirical evidence that voice is an important
component of perceptions of legitimacy). The lack of a voice is also theorized as an obstacle to
collaborative contractual relations. See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1422-23.
296.
See supra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2.
297.
See supra Section III.A.1.
298.
Telephone Interview with M.L (June 8, 2015) (stating that the CFPB does not
look at chargebacks). The FTC, the primary regulator of online intermediary companies such as Airbnb
and Amazon, does not regularly collect information about companies’ complaint processes. Cf. Van
Loo, supra note 230, at 1381 (describing the FTC’s general lack of collection of private information
from companies).
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Second, public actors pay inadequate attention to reputation websites. As
mentioned above, it is likely that reputation websites themselves will prove
299
unable to police sellers’ efforts to provide misinformation. Because agencies
pay almost no attention to reputation websites, courts are currently the only
option. Amazon, despite its substantial internal efforts to police reviews, is
currently suing numerous websites that post fake reviews, such as the
300
incautiously named BuyAmazonReviews.com.
Fake reviews can be fought
on legal grounds including consumer protection statutes preventing unfair and
301
deceptive practices, and unfair competition. However, sellers’ fast-changing,
innovative efforts to avoid the limits of the law raise questions about courts’
ability to keep up. For example, instead of directly instructing writers to write
favorable reviews, sellers ask hired writers not to provide feedback unless they
302
will provide five-star reviews. It is unclear whether the law is set to prevent
these and other practices such as the hotel’s contract clause requiring the
303
consumer to pay five hundred dollars for leaving a negative review online.
Moreover, no entity is regularly inquiring into how Amazon, Yelp, and other
companies may be influencing their internal ratings systems for profit without
consumers’ knowledge, rather than simply policing reviews of products sold by
304
third parties.
Finally, a system that relies so heavily on regulation for its public dispute
resolution faces institutional limits of the agency. These limits include the risk
of over- or under-enforcement. Furthermore, agencies can become underresourced or captured, depriving consumer markets of their primary public
dispute resolution actor.
IV. Policy Considerations
This Article’s main purpose is to illuminate the institutions that govern the
vast majority of consumer disputes. Nonetheless, a discussion of reforms is
merited given the preliminary evidence of pitfalls in the private order and
limitations in its public backdrop. Also, legal scholars, legislators, and agencies

299.
See supra Section II.B.4.
300.
See George Anderson, Amazon Lawsuit Takes on Fake Reviewers, FORBES,
April 13, 2015.
301.
See id.; Dohse, supra note 235.
302.
See Streitfeld, supra note 234.
303.
See supra note 174. However, California has passed anti-gag legislation, and
there are signs federal legislators may pass similar legislation. See Chris Morran, Complain All You
Want, California! State Outlaws Silly Non-Disparagement Clauses, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 10, 2014)
http://consumerist.com/2014/09/10/complain-all-you-want-california-state-outlaws-silly-non
-disparagement-clauses.
304.
Although regulators have been slow to enter this arena, the FTC has said that
online writers such as bloggers must disclose any conflict of interest, such as having received a free
product. See Stephanie Schwab, Disclosures for Bloggers and Brands, SOCIAL MEDIA EXPLORER (Apr.
24, 2013), http://www.socialmediaexplorer.com/social-media-marketing/disclosures-for-bloggers-and
-brands.
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have paid intense attention in recent years to the question of how to improve
consumer dispute resolution. Yet those conversations have rarely considered
consumer-facing corporations’ internal processes. This Part considers how a
reform analysis might proceed in light of a broader perspective on private
ordering.
As a threshold matter, any proposal for improving consumer dispute
resolution should be assessed by how it would interact with the existing private
and public actors. To have as substantial an impact as possible, it would need
to affect the institutional heart of the consumer legal system—the corporation’s
internal dispute institutions. To have a net positive impact, it would need to
improve on the current regulatory architecture. At its best, the web of
corporations in their interlocking courthouse roles currently provides a strong
framework for dispute resolution. Competitive forces are in some markets
driving the corporation toward providing more collaborative, low-cost, and
responsive access to justice. The current regulatory architecture demonstrates a
strong preference for allowing the private order to flourish largely unchecked.
When public intervention is needed to resolve small-value consumer disputes,
the preferred mechanism is currently public enforcement actions rather than
private lawsuits.
In light of the existing system’s strengths and limitations, several
principles would help gauge whether a proposed regulatory architecture might
overall improve the system. First, public intervention should rely on the
economic incentives of firms as much as possible. This reliance would mean
defaulting whenever possible to private ordering and its mainstays: business
self-governance, adjudication by other firms, and reputation-based
enforcement. A heavy reliance on private ordering is unavoidable because
small-value consumer disputes cannot cover the costs of expensive resolution
processes. The more the firm acts to improve dispute resolution on its own,
without involving a public sector third party, the less the regulatory regime will
cost, and the greater the potential for good faith contractual renegotiation that
might otherwise prove unadministrable. A corollary to this principle is that any
regulatory architecture must be dynamic—able to adjust as the private sector
improves or worsens its dispute resolution in accordance with procedural
experimentalism.
Second, the new regime would ideally provide regular visibility into
businesses’ internal operations, because they change rapidly and lack
transparency. The idea would be to remove the blind spots of reputation-based
sanctions rather than to replace them. Third, the regulatory architecture should
prioritize public decision makers with general economic expertise and textured
industry knowledge. Relevant background will help decision makers discern
the complex interplay between market failures and justice. Finally, it would be
preferable to minimize the risks of over-reliance on the administrative agency
in light of the potential for capture and poor performance.
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The discussion below offers several concrete policy ideas that meet these
general criteria. These ideas include (1) ensuring informed administrative
agencies that understand companies’ internal dispute processes, (2) leveraging
the informational power of complaints, and (3) sunrise class actions. The list is
not meant to be exhaustive or final. Indeed, other public reforms such as online
dispute resolution linked to public courts may yet prove promising. Instead, the
reform ideas below are offered because they have potential to improve the
existing regulatory architecture in ways that existing proposals do not, and they
serve to illustrate the kind of recommendations that flow from a more holistic
systems analysis of consumer disputes. The end state would ideally not be more
regulation, but more sophisticated regulation tailored to the private ordering in
place.
A. Regulatory Supervision
Agencies have the statutory authority to play a larger role in addressing
the pitfalls of the private consumer legal system. The two main consumer
agencies, the FTC and the CFPB, have the ability to collect information that
would enable them to determine how companies decide on disputes, as part of
their larger information collection authority for consumer protection
305
306
purposes.
Yet they and other agencies rarely do so. If agencies were to
collect the information necessary to identify problematic dispute resolution
practices, they would have many options for taking action. In some instances,
agencies may conclude no action is necessary because markets are sufficiently
307
moving corporations in the right direction. If not, agencies could promulgate
rules, inform consumers, informally ask corporations to self-monitor, open a
308
309
legal case,
or lobby Congress for new industry standards.
The most

305.
This authority comes from their broader information collection authority. See
The FTC’s Annual Line-of-Business Reporting Program, 1975 DUKE L.J. 389, 394-96 (1975)
(describing how courts have interpreted the FTC’s information collection powers expansively, including
for the collection of non-public information from firms); Braucher & Littwin, supra note 272, at 19
(explaining the CFPB’s “broad information-gathering capabilities”).
306.
The closest to this is the DOT’s auditing of complaint data to ensure airlines
seek volunteers before bumping passengers. See supra Section III.A.1. The CFPB’s examination arm
does not inquire into how banks resolve complaints, but does look into the timeliness of complaint
resolution and expects processes that enable banks to identify legal violations unearthed through the
complaint process. Telephone Interview with M.L. (June 8, 2015).
307.
See supra Section I.A.
308.
Cases might be brought on a number of legal grounds, including unfair and
deceptive acts and the doctrine of good faith. See MARKOVITS, supra note 14, at 1321 (mentioning the
possibility of courts conceiving of customer service in accordance with contract principles analogous to
the duty of good faith in performance); Eric G. Anderson, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts,
73 IOWA L. REV. 299, 301 (1988) (noting that the doctrine of good faith “[a]ccounts for many cases in
which courts have, or should have, declined to enforce an express contractual condition and illustrates
that a number of decisions in which courts have cited public policy reasons for refusing to enforce a
contract can be justified more satisfactorily by a good faith doctrine that respects, rather than trumps,
freedom of contract.”); Van Loo, supra note 230, at 1373-74 (explaining how federal agency powers to
regulate unfair acts is broad and would likely apply to behaviorally based practices).
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immediate question is whether and how agencies should use their information
collection authority.
The most appropriate mechanism for such information collection is
through supervision powers rather than enforcement powers. Despite the
implications of heavy-handedness implicit in the name, supervision can be a
particularly light regulatory mechanism by which non-lawyer examiners collect
information periodically outside the legal process to enable informed
310
decisionmaking.
Supervision is a form of “responsive regulation” aimed at
311
self-monitoring.
Indeed, the current minimal regulatory structure for
complaints in the airline industry, which relies on self-monitoring and retention
312
of reports that the DOT can audit, is a form of supervision.
Greater
supervision of complaint handling could involve as little as having one nonlawyer regulatory employee conduct two-hour interviews with a few companies
in an industry each year to determine how the companies’ dispute algorithms
work. Or it could involve more regular randomized spot check collection of
data, such as internal decision trees used by customer service. Any such
preliminary data collection could then form the basis for deciding whether
further supervision or other action is warranted.
Regardless of the specific type and quantity of information collection, the
larger point is that the FTC and the CFPB could use their supervisory powers
periodically to stay up-to-date on how corporations adjudicate consumer
disputes in various industries, ideally in partnership with other agencies such as
313
the DOT and FCC.
Because widespread frequent supervision of diverse
industries is impractical and unnecessary, supervisory efforts should target
problematic industries and the most valuable information. Signs that an
industry is potentially more problematic include higher consumer costs of

309.
J. Maria Glover has proposed Federal Rules of Civil Settlement that would align
pretrial settlements more closely with the law. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil
Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1713 (2012). An analogous idea could be developed for even nonlawyers handling consumer disputes regardless of whether a trial is feasible. Alternatively, ethics
standards could be developed for those who design dispute resolution systems. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should (Not) Do
About It: Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 198 (2009)
(discussing the possibility of a “separate set of ethics standards or guidelines for those who design
‘systems’ of dispute resolution for institutions. . . .”).
310.
One reason why supervision is sometimes associated with heavy regulation is
that its deployment in the financial sector involves regular on-site examinations and collection of large
volumes of financial information from institutions, a process often seen by banks as oppressive. See
Julie A. Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals of Material
Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101 (2015) (describing financial sector regulatory
supervision and identifying significant contributors to dissatisfaction with examinations). See also Van
Loo, supra note 230 (proposing a light-touch supervision model for consumer goods in contrast to the
heavier model in consumer finance).
311.
See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE, 101-05 (1992).
312.
See 14 C.F.R. § 259.5(c) (2011).
313.
See id.

596

Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547 (2016).

switching between competitors, a lack of continuing relationships, and high
314
market concentration.
The idea of supervising complaint processes requires further development,
and the costs of such a program would need to be weighed carefully. For
example, even minimal supervision involves costs, and it would be
counterproductive if corporations responded by halting collection of complaint
data. However, given the size of most large consumer corporations, the
expenses of complying with a light-touch supervisory program would likely be
minimal. Moreover, informed regulators make it possible to address the pitfalls
of the corporate courthouse without more costly involvement of public courts.
B. Leveraging the Informational Power of Complaints
Given the many ways that businesses aim to undermine consumer
complaints, reputation-based sanctions might need public support. Although
legislative action could prove useful, such as a non-confidentiality law limiting
315
companies’ ability to put gag orders on consumers, this section explores two
possible non-legislative improvements to reputation-based sanctions that are
within regulators’ current mandate: (1) digitally monitoring a larger universe of
private sector complaint data, and (2) enhanced regulatory complaint
processing.
Regulators could potentially integrate data from a variety of websites,
such as Yelp, Amazon, and Google, to develop a form of meta-complaint
intelligence about the complaint universe. A larger-scale version of this
complaint network would also draw on corporations’ internal complaint data—
such as American Airlines’ or Citibank’s—if possible to do so without great
expense to the corporation and while protecting the privacy of consumers.
Regardless of which sources it linked to, this meta-complaint database could be
used, first, to improve the informational power of regulators’ complaint
analysis software. Regulatory complaints constitute a tiny fraction of
complaints submitted to companies—perhaps one complaint is submitted to
316
regulators for every two hundred or more submitted to companies.
The
CFPB, FTC, and FCC already have sophisticated software for analyzing their
317
own complaints for trends. They could presumably use that software to
identify concerning complaint trends more rapidly, and thus provide better
aggregate redress in the absence of class actions. For example, metrics such as

314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra Section II.B.4.
See Huba, supra note 174.
Telephone Interview with S.N. (May 28, 2015).
See supra note 291.
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post-complaint attrition rate and complaint rate per transaction could flag the
318
need for heightened supervision when compared with industry peers.
Second, such a complaint network might become capable of flagging
suspicious complaint behavior across intermediary platforms. For example,
software with textual analysis could identify similar complaint language
submitted from various IP addresses scattered throughout the world. Third, this
meta-complaint database could improve complaint handling in markets lacking
vigorous competition. It could do so by making it easier for consumers
dissatisfied with the complaint process to attract regulators’ attention wherever
they may complain. This would incentivize companies to pay more attention
when a consumer reaches out with a dispute.
Another consideration for better leveraging the informational power of
complaints would simply be for regulators to improve how they process
complaints submitted directly to them. The CFPB, as a new agency started in
2011, has raised the bar for governmental complaint processing by following
up with companies to check whether they adequately resolve complaints and by
319
posting complaints online. The preliminary evidence is that this has had a
beneficial impact on financial institutions’ internal complaint handling
320
systems.
Other agencies with a mandate to process complaints, such as the
FTC, could follow suit. It may not be fair to expect the FTC to reach the same
level of complaint handling as the CFPB because the agencies have different
mandates and resources. The FTC’s historical complaint resolution rate of close
to fifty percent however—to the extent it is comparable to the CFPB’s ninety321
three
percent
rate—may
indicate
substandard
performance.
Intergovernmental agency metrics comparing complaint-handling rates,
whether done by the White House or by congressional inquiry, could prod the
FTC toward the CFPB’s performance levels.
Both of these paths involve costs. Resources devoted to complaint
processing are diverted from other functions, such as enforcement and
322
supervision. There are also risks in giving too much power to consumer
complaints, leading to inefficient levels of complaint handling. Moreover,
agencies’ efforts to produce digital tools would face obstacles given firms’

318.
The idea would be to establish a yardstick. Cf. Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski,
Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781
(2015) (describing how a regulatory system of yardstick penalties could advance policy).
319.
See supra Section III.A.3.
320.
See id.
321.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Fall 2014), Semi Annual Report 2,
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_semi-annual-report-fall-2014.pdf (reporting companies
responded to over ninety-three percent of forwarded complaints, with another four percent under
review); Porter, supra note 49, at 83 (explaining that about half of all FTC complaints have historically
been resolved, meaning the regulator intervened or received assurance that the complaint was handled
by the company).
322.
See Porter, supra note 49, at 84 (discussing the tradeoff between processing
complaints and other regulatory functions).
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323

great technological resources.
These and other costs would need to be
weighed closely. However, much of governmental complaint processing is
automated, as is the submission of complaints in the private sector. It is thus
quite possible that efficient ways of linking public and private complaints, and
of processing governmental complaints, are worthy of experimentation.
C. Sunrise Class Actions
The CFPB is currently weighing whether to prevent financial institutions
324
from using mandatory arbitration clauses, thereby reinstating class actions.
The discussion above suggests that a legal system with widespread class action
availability may not benefit consumers in markets in which the private legal
system and regulators are functioning well. At the same time, class actions
325
could improve dispute resolution in markets that lack those features. The
CFPB has strong mechanisms in place to guard against under-resourcing and
capture, but these safeguards have their limits and other relevant agencies have
326
a weaker institutional design.
Because regulation alone will often prove
inadequate, it is worth considering how to make class actions available only in
327
the face of evidence of market failures and regulatory inaction. These could
328
be termed “sunrise class actions,”
in contrast to the sunset clauses that end
after a certain time period. For example, the U.S. Constitution states that
329
appropriations for military operations must last no longer than two years.
In a sense, sunrise class actions are a regulatory approach aimed at
“inducing attorneys to mimic the results that a healthy, functioning market for

323.
See generally Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2017) (outlining challenges facing administrative agencies’ use of digital tools).
324.
See Emma Gallimore, Attorney Expects CFPB To Release New Arbitration
Rules this Year, LEGALNEWSLINE, Mar. 14, 2016, http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510698672-attorney
-expects-cfpb-to-release-new-arbitration-rules-this-year.
325.
Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
369, 389 (2012) (“At present, it is precisely where public enforcement is difficult, compromised,
captured, or under-resourced that the flexibility and the entrepreneurial drive behind the class action are
most decisive and most significant.”).
326.
See Barkow, supra note 274, at 16-18 (articulating aspects of the CFPB’s
institutional design that insulate it from capture and distinguishing those features from other agencies);
Braucher & Littwin, supra note 272, at 810-812 (explaining the risk of CFPB capture as well as
statutory and institutional factors that may enable the agency to resist capture).
327.
Other anti-capture measures are also worth considering, such as linking
regulators’ pay to performance. See M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator
Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2012).
328.
The concept of sunrise clauses is commonly discussed in constitutional law,
denoting a clause that would become activated after a certain time period. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 474-75 (2012)
(arguing the framers should have used more sunrise clauses); Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh
Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975, 1979 (2015) (exploring sunrise lawmaking); Sofia Ranchordas, Innovation
Experimentalism, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (2015) (discussing how time-limited clauses can be
balanced with innovation in regulation).
329.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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330

legal services would produce.” Developing a set of criteria that would trigger
class action availability requires further study, although a robust literature
aimed at reining in class actions provides a strong foundation for developing
331
these criteria. Three categories of filters are particularly relevant. First, in
certifying a class action, judges could look for signs of market failure such as a
high industry concentration and high rate of consumer complaints. Second, the
current ninety-day period mandated by the Class Action Fairness Act for
ensuring that relevant agencies—which means the Attorney General at the
federal level—are notified could be used more proactively to determine
whether federal consumer agencies will act on the issue, thus avoiding
332
duplicative efforts. Third, the decision as to whether to make class actions
available might be informed by the institutional design of agencies in a
particular industry. Institutional features such as independent funding and the
ease of removing the agency head, as well an analysis of historical funding
333
levels, are factors that policy makers can weigh.
Scholars have constructed mechanisms that could be seen as sunrise class
actions, although not designed for that purpose. For example, to provide
aggregate redress under a mandatory arbitration regime, Professors Miriam
Gilles and Gary Friedman have proposed that attorneys general could leverage
the private bar to bring class action suits on behalf of consumers. Private-sector
attorneys would litigate the cases under the attorney general’s powers, thus
334
circumventing any contractual prohibition of class actions. This proposal
335
puts the attorney general in a “litigation gatekeeper” role. More broadly,
attorneys general, or under-resourced consumer agencies, could decide when
markets have failed or regulation is inadequate, and then could partner with
plaintiffs’ firms to create a form of sunrise class actions.
Several limitations are worth considering. Sunrise class actions may work
less well for some problems, such as racial discrimination in the
336
marketplace. Such cases might not be adequately policed by reputation-based

330.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 (1987).
331.
See William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1442 (2006) (reviewing the literature proposing solutions for
limiting unnecessary class actions).
332.
See generally id., at 1448 (2006) (describing the ninety-day period in the Class
Action Fairness Act and its limitations); Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision:
Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1972 (2008) (describing the current notice
requirement, including the Attorney General as the relevant federal agency).
333.
See Barkow, supra note 274, at 16-18.
334.
See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012).
335.
See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE
L.J. 616, 620 (2013).
336.
Scholars have offered evidence of racial discrimination in a variety of
commercial settings. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 817-819 (1991) (offering data from an experiment finding
evidence of racial and gender discrimination in the sale of automobiles).
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mechanisms and vigorous regulation, due to the potential for minority voices to
337
be drowned out. This would suggest that some categories of suits should be
widely available and not subject to the additional restrictions of sunrise class
actions.
More broadly, sunrise class actions might prove costly and difficult to
administer. Increased costs would come from requiring additional litigation to
obtain certification. Difficulties in administration would result, for example,
from the inevitable disagreement among economists about what evidence
establishes market failures, and what conditions are necessary to establish
sufficient competition. This disagreement makes it difficult to weigh such
338
criteria.
These are not trivial concerns. Nor is the alternative particularly attractive:
either allowing class actions as blunt instruments even when regulators would
do the job better, or the absence of class actions even when regulators fail.
Conclusion
The private ordering of consumer disputes relies on a complex system.
The arbitration tribunal is one actor in this system. Yet for most disputes, the
arbitral tribunal—like the public courthouse—is not an option. Instead, the
consumer-facing corporation provides the institutional framework for
contractual settlement, adjudication, and enforcement.
Much is unknown about this private consumer legal system. Accordingly,
this Article does not seek to provide a definitive account. However, based on
limited data there is cause for both optimism and concern. In some contexts, the
corporation as the de facto courthouse is more responsive to consumers’ basic
procedural preferences and provides greater substantive redress for a larger
number of people than can arbitration tribunals or public courts. At the same
time, behind a veil of trade secrecy corporations’ dispute systems exploit
market failures and use unequal rules of procedure.
It is possible that private actors such as startups will develop innovative
solutions to address evolving dispute resolution pitfalls. For now, however, the
key procedural decisions happen where only regulators can practically look—
inside the corporation. It is thus worth asking whether administrative agencies
should use their authority to at least diagnose the heart of the consumer legal
system. More importantly, this Article’s analysis indicates the need to examine
a broader set of interconnected institutions, and highlights new questions with
great social significance.
337.
As Professor Bagenstos puts it, “Civil rights laws don’t enforce themselves.”
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1459,
1460 (2007).
338.
See, e.g., Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust
Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in the Battle of the Experts, 106 NW U. L. REV. 1261, 1300
(2012).
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This perspective has implications well beyond monetary disputes. An
individual’s credit report can determine the ultimate outcome for an apartment
rental, mortgage qualification, or job. Yet three companies control the credit
report market, and have established flawed dispute resolution procedures for
correcting even egregious errors on peoples’ credit reports. Comcast and
YouTube regularly stop their own consumers from downloading or posting
videos that other large corporations, such as Disney, argue violate intellectual
339
property law.
Companies such as Twitter and Reddit are policing hate
340
speech, spam, and bullying.
In diverse contexts, research into the
corporation’s rapidly expanding quasi-judicial role would illuminate not only
the state of consumer rights, but also what procedural interventions society
truly needs.

339.
See Chris Morran, Comcast Can Interrupt Your Web Browsing With Warnings
About Potentially Illegal File-Sharing, CONSUMERIST, https://consumerist.com/2015/11/23/comcast
-can-interrupt-your-web-browsing-with-warnings-about-potentially-illegal-file-sharing (Nov. 23, 2015).
340.
See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Reddit Steps Up Anti-Harassment Measures With New
Blocking Tool, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2016, at B1.
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